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ABSTRACT
The Doctoral dissertation centers on social preferences. Three experimental studiesaddress the identification methods and the implications of distributional prefer-ence types and pro-sociality on economic decision-making.
In Chapter 1, the identification of social preference types using distributive choices
is discussed. A thorough review shows that the two main approaches - parametric
and non-parametric- have been productively used but produced inconsistent results in
previous studies. The experiment in this Chapter is designed to examine the categorical
agreement between the two methods: whether they classify the same subject into the
same type.
Chapter 2 presents a laboratory experiment investigating whether people strategi-
cally signal a certain type of social preferences. I consider four different distributional
types and compare the distribution of these types under two settings: with and without
strategic reasoning.
In Chapter 3, I report an experimental study on the strategic exploitation of others’
pro-sociality for own’s benefit. This study is conducted within the principal-agent frame-
work and aims to test whether employers make use of workers’ pro-social motivation,
offering a compensation scheme which is tailored with workers’ pro-sociality.
v
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past 40 years, economists have been conducting experiments to explore how
human economic decision-making works, providing strong evidences on the substantial
deviation of human economic reasoning from the prediction of standard game theory
under risk and uncertainty, bargaining problems, cooperation dilemmas, etc. (Henrich,
2000). One of the most remarkable findings in behavioral and experimental economics is
the recognition of social preferences.
Even though the idea of non-selfish motives has been rooted long time ago (e.g.,
Jevons, 1871; Edgeworth, 1881; Adams, 1963), it was a game-changing point when
Werner Gu¨th and his coauthors published the first experimental results on the so-
called Ultimatum Game (UG), which efficiently explains the notion of social preferences.
Two people, randomly assigned as a Proposer and a Recipient, are given an amount of
money (i.e., endowment), the Proposer can decide how much he/she wants to keep for
himself/herself and how much he/she wants to offer to the Recipient while the Recipient
can decide whether to accept the offer. If the Recipient accepts the offer, they will earn the
amount of money as divided. If the Recipient rejects the offer, they will earn nothing. UG
experiments have been run in many different countries and with numerous modification
but its result is robust and at odds to traditional economics: on average, Proposers
give about 30% to 45 % of the endowment; the rejection rate of Recipients is typically
from 0% to 30%; offers larger than 40% are rarely rejected and offers smaller than 20%
are frequently rejected (for an extensive review of UG see Oosterbeek, Sloof & Van De
Kuilen, 2004). These results clearly oppose to the subgame-perfect equilibrium with
selfish individuals. The plausible explanation for Proposers’ and Recipients’ behavior
in the UG is that people are not solely motivated by material own payoffs but also care
about the well-being of others.
Since the publication of Gu¨th et al. (1982), social preferences have received mas-
sive attention and research on social preferences have made profound contributions to
the growing body of behavioral and experimental economics. The literature on social
preferences consists of three main streams including experimental evidence of social
1
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preferences, theoretical framework of social preferences and the relationship between
social preferences and other variables.
The first stream aims at proving the existence of social preferences which also go
under other different names including other-regarding preferences, social motives and
social value orientation. Experimentalists have used a variety of economic games and
have found social preferences in various settings. To disentangle the fairness concern
from the strategic reasoning of Proposers in UG, Forsythe et al. (1994) introduced the
Dictator Game (DG) in which Proposers are asked to split up an endowment and Recipi-
ents cannot reject the offer. On average, people share about 20-30% of the endowment
(see Engel (2011) for a meta-analysis). Despite the fact that the result of DG is highly
sensitive to the experimental variation, it is usually far different from the prediction of
neoclassical economic theories. Due to its simplicity and non strategic feature, DG has
become a popular tool to measure pro-sociality and identify some forms of other-regarding
preferences such as altruism, maximin or inequality aversion.
The second popular economic game is the Trust Game (TG). The TG is a sequential-
move game in which two players are given equal endowments; Player 1 sends an amount
of money to Player 2; Player 2 can decide whether to send back some money. The amount
of money received by Player 1 would equal the amount sent by Player 2 multiplied with
a factor larger than 1. TG has been introduced since 1995 by Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe
but the first successful attempt to discover the embedded other-regarding preferences in
the TG is Cox (2004). He found that the both players exhibit a clear deviation from the
game-theoric prediction with selfishness and rationality: Player 1 sends a substantially
positive amount of money to Player 2; Player 2 returns a positive amount of money which
increases in what Player 1 has sent. The two motives in the TG are identified as trust
and positive reciprocity.
The experimental evidence of the gift-exchange game (GEG) particularly plays an
important role in the recognition of social preferences, as stated in Cooper & Kagel
(2009):“If there is any one reason why economists who are not experimenters should care
about other-regarding behavior, the literature on gift-exchange is it." The GEG captures
the principal-agent relationship in which principals typically decide on the compensation
scheme to offer to agents, agents then decide on the costly effort level. The higher the
effort level is, the more profit principals earn. Previous experimental studies (e.g., Fehr,
Kirchsteiger & Riedl, 1998; Brandts & Charness, 1999) have shown that the average
effort level is positively correlated to the wage offer, which adheres to the reciprocal
pattern.
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Last but not least, another important game that has changed the exclusive reliance
on the self-interest hypothesis is the Public Good Game (PGG). PGG is important because
like the GEG, PGG mimics a real-world situation. In a basic PGG, n subjects decide how
much they would contribute to a public good and keep the amount of money they do
not contribute. The total contribution is multiplied with a factor larger than 1 and then
divided between n subjects. Selfish and rational people would not contribute anything.
A typical result of PGG is that with one-shot game, the average contribution is about
half the socially optimal level whereas with repeated game, the contribution starts high,
gradually reduces across rounds and is close to zero at the last round (see Dawes &
Thaler, 1988 for a review). The decline of contribution is a sign of negative reciprocity:
high contributors observe other people free-riding and hence, contribute less or also
free-ride. Within the realm of repeated PGG, to capture the reaction of subjects towards
what others do previously, subjects may be classified into conditional cooperators who
are reciprocators and unconditional cooperators who are altruists.
The above results and those from many other experiments have proved that peo-
ple systematically deviate from the self-regarding Nash prediction and hence, social
preferences are not just the exception. Evidence of social preferences made economists
start questioning the descriptive validity of the standard economic model of individual
behavior and looking for alternatives. This leads to the next stream of studies, which
focuses on the development of other-regarding preference models. These models attempt
to define and rationalize the non-selfish motives and hence, attain a unifying explanation
of social preferences.
The “classic" social preference models are distributional preferences or outcome-
based preferences which assume that people care only about the final distribution of
payoffs among themselves and others. The most influential models of this type are Fehr
& Schmidt (1999), Bolton & Ockenfels (1998, 2000) and Charness and Rabin (2002).
The essence of these models is to assume that in a decision maker’s utility function,
he/she also places some weight on the payoffs of others. People would still decide so as
to maximize their utility and hence, the rationality assumption is maintained. These
models have been received an enormous attention due to their simplicity and tractability
as they summarize a lot of anomalies of expected utility theory into only two to four
motives: inequality aversion, efficiency concerns, maximin and competitive preferences (a
review of these studies is in Chapter 1).
The above models of outcome-based preferences apparently do not cover the recip-
rocal motives found in experiments with TG, GEG and PGG. As a result, the models of
3
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reciprocity are introduced and can be divided into two categories: (1) intention-based
reciprocity which is defined as a behavioral response to a friendly or hostile action (e.g.,
Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; Charness & Rabin, 2006);
(2) type-based reciprocity which is defined as a behavioral response to others’ preferences
(e.g., Levine, 1998). These models incorporate only intentions (e.g., Dufwenberg & Kirch-
steiger, 2004) or both intentions and outcomes (e.g., Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; Charness
& Rabin, 2006). Experimental works have shown that reciprocity is a prominent determi-
nant (see Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002 for a review) and might be stronger motive compared
to a certain type of outcome-based preferences in some circumstances (e.g., Falk et al.,
2000). Nevertheless, models of reciprocity are extremely difficult to understand and not
tractable. Measuring reciprocity empirically is also challenging as it usually deals with
beliefs and beliefs are not easily assessable. As a consequence, models of outcome-based
preferences are used more often as tools for understanding experimental data.
Studies in the third stream of the literature work on the interplay between social pref-
erences and economic outcomes (e.g., productivity, contracting, charity giving) and other
socio-demographic characteristics (e.g., gender, political attitude) both in the lab and in
the field. Social preferences have been proved to be associated with social intelligence
(e.g., Andeou, 2006); charity giving (e.g., DellaVigna, List & Malmendier, 2012); com-
petitiveness (Bartling et al., 2009); strategic uncertainty aversion (e.g., Cabrales et al.,
2010); productivity (e.g., Carpenter & Seki, 2011); incentives (e.g., Bandiera, Barankay
& Rasul, 2005); group identity (e.g., Chen & Li, 2009). These findings have brought about
practical significance for not only theorists and experimentalists but also far-reaching
implications for policymakers.
Studies on social preferences concur that all distributional, reciprocal and selfish
motive have important and significant effect in many economic decisions. In some
situations, even a (small) proportion of people with other-regarding preferences could
lead to the deviation in behaviors of the whole population. Theoretically, Fehr & Schmidt
(1999) have shown that a few inequality-averse subjects can create incentives and induce
other selfish counterparts to contribute in the PGG and vice versa, a minority of selfish
subjects can induce reciprocal or inequality-averse subjects to free-ride in simultaneous
social dilemmas. With regard to experimental evidence, the most typical example is
how some people with social preferences can change incentive and effort provision in
a principal-agent setting. Fehr, Klein & Schmidt (2007) have provided evidence that
the presence of some fair-minded workers can make fairness concern become a good
enforcement device and hence, bonus contracts would outperform the explicit incentive
4
ones.
By all means, not everyone exhibits social preferences and not all findings on social
preferences can provide reliable inferences in the real-world situation (see Levitt &
List, 2007 for a discussion). That being said, it is safe to say that there is a substantial
proportion of people who have other-regarding preferences and there are economic
consequences caused by these preferences at both individual and aggregate level. In
other words, the presence of agents with other-regarding preferences have become
undeniable and have enriched the characterization of economic agents.
Motivation of the dissertation
The topic of social preferences is the most popular one in experimental economics,
accounting for 35.4% of all papers (Noussair, 2011). One may agree with Brandts &
Fatas (2012) that research in experimental economics has produced abundant evidence
on how people care about others’ well-being. Yet, there are still many aspects of social
preferences that remain ambiguous.
The first one is the identification method. Different economic games and decision tasks
have been used when identifying distributional preferences. Despite the overwhelming
number of studies on social preferences, there has been no agreement on the identification
as well as the distribution of social preferences. This lack of a unified, overarching
identification method is problematic since the identification of social preference types are
critical and indispensable regardless of the stream of research on social preferences. As
such, one’s type has to be identified reliably and validly, especially when social preference
types serve as predictors. Yet, it remains unknown how the different identification
methods work and how to use them effectively.
The second aspect is how people manipulate their own’s social preferences and
react to others’ social preferences. As mentioned earlier, there is ample evidence of how
social preferences associate with other constructs and a (even minor) proportion of a
specific social preference type may affect the incentives or behaviors of other types in the
population. However, there are very few experiments that convincingly and explicitly
study how people utilize social preference types. In a real-world setting, the observability
of social preference types is inevitable as each individual has hundreds of interactions
with others in the daily basis. Hence, a legitimate conjecture is that one can make
use of his/her own or others’ social preference types for their own benefit. It would be
interesting to adopt this idea into a well-controlled laboratory setting in which subjects
5
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can reveal their social preferences to their partners or they can observe their partners’
social preferences before making economic decision.
Before proceeding, it should be noted that in Fisman, Kariv & Markovits (2007),
social preferences (i.e., preferences on others’ payoffs) and preferences for giving (i.e.,
preferences on one’s payoff and others’ payoffs) are defined as two types of distributional
preferences. However, these two types of preferences rarely operate separately. Within
the scope of this dissertation, the two terms "distributional preferences" and "social
preferences" would be used interchangeably.
Outline of the dissertation
The dissertation is composed of three main chapters.
The first chapter documents a narrative review on the distributional type identifi-
cation approaches using distributive choices. There are two methods which have been
used in experimental economics namely parametric and non-parametric one. By figur-
ing out the differences between the two approaches, I discuss potential benefits and
shortcomings of using these methods in lab-controlled environment. As a by-product,
the influential theories of social preferences which initiate the categorization of distri-
butional preference types are also reviewed. This chapter is particularly relevant and
crucial for the methodological approach used in the next experimental chapters of the
dissertation.
Given the inconsistency of results on the distribution of social preference types across
studies, I implement an online experiment in which subjects are asked to complete
two allocation tasks designed by the non-parametric and parametric approach for the
identification of social preference types. Those allocation tasks have been used previously
in other papers. The aim of the online experiment is to examine the categorical agreement
of the two methods: whether they categorize the same subject into the same type.
In Chapter 2, social preference types are experimentally examined as a signaling
device. The research question is whether people can manipulate the signal about their
own social preference types to gain higher economic benefits. We compare the distribution
of social preference types under two settings: with and without strategic reasoning. In
the lab, subjects’ social preferences are elicited with a distribution task before they play
a modified Dictator Game in which the Dictator may observe his/her matched Recipient’s
type before making offer.
The experimental set-up with the signal-revising and signal-sending option for Re-
cipients allows us to conduct both within- and between-subject analysis. Using the
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belief-dependent framework, we hypothesize that Recipients would strategically signal
as inequality averse type to get higher offer in DG: (1) non inequality-averse Recipients
would revise their choices in the distribution task to signal as inequality averse; (2)
the distribution of signal senders’ social preference types is different from the one of
Recipients who do not send signal. The novelty of our study resides in the introduction
of an allocation task with four distributive choices which corresponds to four social
preference types including selfish, efficiency concern, inequality averse and competitive,
rather than only two categories: selfish and pro-social as in previous studies on signaling
social preferences. We also depart from the focus on signal receivers in previous studies
to signal senders.
If Chapter 2 clarifies how one strategically uses his/her own social preference type,
Chapter 3 reports an experimental study on the strategic exploitation of others’ social
preference types for own’s benefit. We conduct the study within the classical principal-
agent setting and investigate how employers make use of workers’ pro-social motivation.
In the lab, we use two DGs as proxy for subjects’ pro-sociality: one in which Recipients
are participants in the experiment and another one in which Recipients are charity
organizations. Then, subjects who are assigned as employers will offer a compensation
scheme to their matched workers. Workers will perform a real-effort task and get paid
according to the chosen scheme. There are two contract options: (1) a piece-rate contract;
(2) a flat pay contract with effort-contingent charity giving (i.e., the charity’s donation
depends on the number of completed sliders).
We compare workers’ effort, employers’ contract choice and profit in two situations:
when employers can observe workers’ pro-sociality before making the contract offer and
when they cannot. To my knowledge, it is the first experimental study on how employers
condition their contract choice on workers’ pro-sociality. Moreover, it is also the first to
take into account two dimensions of pro-sociality: pro-sociality towards a similar person
and towards a deserving party and find the actual driver of workers’ effort among the
two dimensions.
In the last section, the results reported in this dissertation and their implications
will be summarized.
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IDENTIFYING DISTRIBUTIONAL PREFERENCE TYPES
WITH DISTRIBUTIVE CHOICES: APPROACHES AND
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
The identification of social preference types is a key research area in experimentaleconomics. There are two major approaches using distributive choices in thisliterature: parametric and non-parametric. Notwithstanding the large number
of papers using these methods, little is known about how the two approaches relatively
work. I present here a review of distributional preference identification methods and
discuss the results obtained from previous studies using these different approaches.
Furthermore, I conduct an online experiment in which subjects perform two allocation
tasks developed within the parametric and non-parametric approach and their social
preference types are identified accordingly. This would allow us to compare the practical
efficiency of the two methodologies and to examine whether they classify subjects in the
same way.
Keywords: distributional preferences; allocation task, distributive choices, Equality
Elicitation Task
JEL Codes: C81, C90, C91, B41
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CHAPTER 1. DISTRIBUTIONAL PREFERENCES TYPES
For between the two extremes Pure Egoistic and Pure Universalistic there
may be an indefinite number of impure methods; where in the happiness of
others as compared by the agent (in a calm moment) with his own, neither
counts for nothing, nor yet “counts for one," but counts for a fraction.
_Francis Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics
1.1 Introduction
The heterogeneity of distributional preferences is no longer questioned. Prior research
has been mainly using so-called decomposed games to assess the individual variation
in social preferences. A decomposed game is basically a choice task in which preference
considerations are decoupled from strategic considerations. It is also known as “allocation
tasks" or “distributive choices" to emphasize the non-strategic nature of social preference
elicitation. A typical example of a decomposed game is the Dictator Game. Another
illustration of the task is to present subjects with a series of allocation decisions and ask
them to select the most preferred apportionment. This kind of game is an attractive tool
to precisely identify the outcome-based preferences because of its simplicity and because
subjects will not be driven by reciprocity.
Allocation tasks have been constructed within two main methodological paradigms,
whether parametric or non-parametric. The parametric one assumes a certain form of
interdependent utility function whereas the non-parametric approach identifies types
based on core features of preferences. Previous studies have assumed different forms of
utility functions, namely linear, piece-wise linear and constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) which then lead to different experimental designs of allocation tasks. The allocation
task designed with the non-parametric approach is commonly called as the Equality
Equivalence Test (EET).
Even though studies on social preference abound, there is still no unified, overarching
identification method of social preference types as well as any guidance for researchers
in deciding which approach to use. The allocation tasks, even generated with the same
approach, and the set of distributional preferences have been varied across studies. More
importantly, the literature on social preferences is nearly silent about how different
identification methods perform: whether they are efficient in terms of the expenditure
of time and effort in the identification process and whether they produce consistent
results. Therefore, in this chapter, I implement a review on distributional preference
identification methods by looking at three specific questions:
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1. What are the main features of the identification approaches?
2. How have they been used in laboratory experiments?
3. Do they classify a subject into the same type?
In the following sections, I examine the first two questions by doing a review on
previous experimental studies. For the last question, I conduct an online experiment
on Prolific Academy - a crowdsourcing platform, in which subjects will complete two
allocations tasks designed with the two identification approaches. This allows us to test
the categorical agreement of those methods.
To the best of my knowledge, this present study would be the first review exclusively
on the identification issue of social preference types using distributive choices and
the first to discuss the categorical agreement of the identification methods. My review
could be a complement to Murphy & Ackermann (2011) and Kerschbamer (2013). The
former offers a qualitative overview of predictive validity of existing social preference
measurement methods mainly in social psychology while the latter provides a review
of the parametric approach. I would add to the literature an up-to-date and current
discussion about social preference types by doing an intensive retrieval of both relevant
published and grey papers and offer my own perspective on these ever-expanding works.
I conclude with a summary of the underlying properties of the identification approaches
and some suggestions for future research.
1.2 Classification of distributional preferences
1.2.1 Parametric approach
The parametric approach relies on the assumption of a specific functional form of utility
to capture distributional preferences. The parametric method is primarily and commonly
designed for theory-testing: it requires to estimate distributional preference parameters
under the assumption that subjects decide according to a structural model of social
preferences. The different allocation tasks in this approach would be designed based on
three different types of utility functions: linear, piece-wise linear and CES, which are
discussed respectively as follows.
1.2.1.1 Linear utility
The most representative method of this utility family is the Social Value Orientation
(SVO) measures which include Ring Test, the SVO Slider Measure and the Triple-
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Dominance measure. Murphy & Ackermann (2011) and Murphy, Ackermann & Hand-
graaf (2011) provide a review and examine the test-retest reliability (i.e., a statistical
technique to estimate the precision of the measurement by repeating the measurement
process on the same subjects) as well as the convergent validity (i.e., a statistical tech-
nique to examine if two methods which measure the same construct are related) among
these tests. These measures share many similarities so I will only discuss about the most
commonly used SVO measure which is the Ring test.
The Ring test quantifies the SVO at individual level, which consists of 24 or 32
allocation decisions. The allocations lie equally spaced on a circle with the origin of
the outcome plane serving as center. In each allocation decision, subjects are given two
allocation options which can be illustrated as two adjacent points located next to each
other on the circle in the (x,y) space where one own’s and another person’s payoffs are
represented on the x- and y-axis respectively. For instance, in Figure 1.1, subjects have
to choose between (10,20) and (12.6,19.7) and between (12.6,19.7) and (15,18.7) and so
on. The payoffs can be either positive or negative.
Figure 1.1: An example of ring test used in
van Dolder & Buskens (2014)
Figure 1.2: Outcome space (Balafoutas et
al., 2013)
The objective function of a subject is given by
Ui =µi.x+λi.y,
where µi and λi are unrestricted and constant and measure how one weights own’s
and other’s payoffs respectively. Given the linearity of utility function, each subject has
one most preferred point on each circle on the (x,y) space which maximizes his/her utility.
By choosing the most preferred allocation option in the “ring", a subject will reflect
his/her most dominant motivation (see Figure 1.2). A preferences type will be defined
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by the sign the parameters µ and λ may take. There are eight SVO categories listed in
Table 1.1 with their corresponding definitions and signs of parameters.
Type Motivation µ λ θ
Altruistic To maximize others’ payoff 0 + 67.5◦ - 112.5◦
Cooperative To maximize the joint payoffs + + 22.5◦ - 67.5◦
Individualistic To maximize own’s payoff + 0 0◦ - 22.5◦
337.5◦ - 0◦
Competitive To maximize the positive difference + - 292.5◦ - 337.5◦
between own’s and other’s payoff
Sadistic To minimize 0 - 292.5◦ - 337.5◦
(Aggressive) the other’s payoff
Sadomasochistic To minimize - - 202.5◦ - 247.5◦
the difference between payoffs
Masochistic To minimize - 0 157.5◦ - 202.5◦
own’s payoff
Martyr To maximize - + 112.5◦ - 157.5◦
the negative difference
between other’s and own’s payoff
Table 1.1: Classification of types with Ring test
On the (x,y) space, the utility function is represented as a motivational vector with the
origin is the center point. The vector is computed by adding the subject’s chosen options
together, yielding two numbers: the sum of selected own’s payoffs (
∑
x) and the sum of
selected payoffs allocated to another person (
∑
y). One’s SVO can be then identified by
measuring the angle of this vector which equals
θ = arctan(
∑
x∑
y
)
The subject is then categorized according to his/her vector’s angle. For example, the
angle of an altruists would lie between 67.5◦ to 112.5◦ while the one of a cooperator
would be between 22.5◦ to 67.5◦ (see Table 1.1).
Practically, subjects in experiments do not always make choices that are exactly
consistent with the utility maximization. The inconsistency will lead to a shorter vector
while with the perfect consistency, the length of the vector would equal twice the radius
of the circle.
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According to Murphy & Ackermann (2011), the most considerable weakness of the
Ring test is that it fails to classify any type which is inconsistent with linearity. For
instance, the inequality averse type can be misclassified as either “altruistic" or “co-
operative". Another drawback of the Ring test is that it contains a large number of
allocation decisions (24 or 32 allocations) so it usually produces a substantial proportion
of inconsistent choices. Nevertheless, compared to the other methods, the Ring test and
also the SVO Slider Measure produce a single index for one’s social preferences which
makes it convenient for both inter- and intra-person comparison.
1.2.1.2 Piece-wise linear utility
Allocation tasks built on the assumption of piece-wise linear utility are mainly designed
within the realm of three pioneering studies modeling distributional preferences includ-
ing Fehr & Schmidt (1999) (FS), Bolton & Ockenfels (2000) (BO) and Charness & Rabin
(2002) (CR). As we will see later, the non-parametric method also adopts the same set of
prominent distributional preference types with the same properties. Hence, it would be
necessary to briefly discuss the aforementioned influential works and their associated
distributional preference types.
FS propose the heterogeneity of preferences in a population with the presence of
inequality averse agents: those who care not only about their own material payoff but
also about the fairness of their own material payoff relative to the payoff of others. This
self-centered fairness consideration is formally presented using a utility function for n
players as follows:
Ui = xi−αi 1n−1Σ j 6=imax[x j− xi,0]−βi
1
n−1Σ j 6=imax[xi− x j,0],
where xi is the material payoff of player i, αi measures player i’s disutility of having
less than player j (often called envy parameter) and βi measures player i’s disutility of
having more than player j (often called guilt parameter). Equivalently, a player will be
characterized by two parameters and identified as an inequality averse one if βi ≤ αi
and 0≤βi < 1.
The BO’s model differs from the FS’s on the premise that apart from their pecuniary
payoff, people are motivated by their relative payoff standing. This means that their
utility function depends not only on their own payoffs but also on the proportion of total
payoffs they receive. Hence, player i’s utility according to BO is
Ui(xi, x−i)= v(xi,δ(xi, x−i))
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where δ(xi, x−i)= xi∑n
j=1 x j
i f
∑n
j=1 x j > 0; 1n otherwise.
Even though the functional forms are different, both FS and BO imply that people
dislike to have more or less than a fair share.
In the CR’s model, apart from the inequality averse type considered in FS, the utility
function also incorporates two motives, namely social-welfare and competitive preference.
People with social-welfare preferences always seek for Pareto improvements: they prefer
higher payoffs for themselves and other people, especially those who are worst-off. People
with competitive preferences, on the contrary, care about their own payoffs and prefer
higher payoffs than others.
For simplicity, consider the case of two players, the CR utility function is as follows:
U j(xi, x j)= (ρ.r+σ.s)xi+ (1−ρ.r−σ.s)x j,
where r = 1 if x j > xi and r = 0 otherwise; s= 1 if x j < xi and s = 0 otherwise.
In words, one’s utility is a weighted sum of his/her own material payoff and another
person’s payoff and the weights are captured by the parameter ρ and σ. CR also do
not place any restriction on these parameters and hence, are able to offer a richer
framework for distributional preferences than FS and BO. In addition, CR distinguish
two kinds of social-welfare preferences, namely efficiency-seeking preference (i.e., a desire
for maximizing the total payoff or social surplus) and maximin preference (i.e., concern
for the person with the lowest payoff). To do so, the above utility function is written in
another form as:
U j = (1−λ)xi+λ{θ.min[xi, x j]+ (1−θ).(xi+ x j)},
where λ ∈ [0,1] measures how player j cares about the social welfare versus his own
material payoff; θ ∈ [0,1] measures how player j cares about helping the worst-off player
versus maximizing the total social surplus. We can see that ρ = λ1+λ(1−θ) and σ= λ(1−θ)1+λ(1−θ) .
Assume subjects’ rationality, each preferences type would determine a specific region
for each of the parameters in the aforementioned utility functions. As such, experimen-
tally, allocation tasks are designed to fulfill the structural assumptions in a specific
model. An example of two-player allocation tasks used in Iriberri & Rey-Biel (2013)
within the realm of CR’s model is shown in Figure 1.3. There are 16 decision tables; 3
options each table. Subjects are asked to choose their preferred option for each table.
15
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Figure 1.3: An example of allocation tasks used in Iriberri & Rey-Biel (2013)
The construction of a decision table is described in Figure 1.4. Three options are
constructed in such a way that the first option gives the highest payoff to the decider
(selfish action); in the second option, the decider earns 1 unit of payoff less than the first
option but the receiver would increase by more than 1 unit (surplus-creating action); the
third option, contrastingly, reduces the receiver’s payoff by more than 1 unit of payoff
while the decider earns 1 unit less compared the first option (surplus-destroying action).
The 16 allocation decisions differ in (1) the gap between the decider’s and the receiver’s
payoff (|x-y|); (2) the relative payoff standing between the decider and the receiver (x >
y or x < y); (3) the size of the surplus-creating or surplus-destroying action (s). There are
four types identified by this procedure, which are also four main distributional preference
16
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types in the literature, including selfish; inequality averse; social welfare and competitive.
Figure 1.4: Construction of a decision table in Iriberri & Rey-Biel (2013)
As can be seen, the parametric identification method with piece-wise linear utility
function can only identify a certain set of social preferences as characterized by a model.
As pointed out by Kerschbamer (2015), this predefined set of types is a considerable
weakness of this method.
1.2.1.3 CES utility
While the key of the parametric method with piece-wise linear utility function lies on
the assumption of a specific utility form and a predefined set of social preference types, a
number of other studies do not specify any priori about the form of utility function but
estimate individuals’ preferences with different structural functions of utility and find
the one that best fits the experimental data.
The most renowned paper adopting this approach is Andreoni & Miller (2002). They
provide subjects with a series of DG including 8 allocation decisions with different
budgets and price of giving (see Figure 1.5). A subject would be asked how many tokens
he/she would keep for himself/herself and how many tokens he/she would give to another
person given the value of a token.
Figure 1.5: Andreoni & Miller (2002)’s allocation decisions
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The experimental result has shown that the piece-wise linear utility function can
rationalize only 43% of subjects’ behaviors. These subjects can be classified into three
main types: Selfish; Leontief and Perfect substitutes. The Leontief and Perfect substitutes
are respectively equivalent to the maximin and efficiency concern preference discussed
in Charness & Rabin (2002).
With regard to the rest 57% of subjects which are clustered by similarities of their
choices and identified as Weak Selfish; Weak Leontief and Weak Perfect substitutes,
Andreoni & Miller (2002) considered three different utility functions including Cobb-
Douglas, Linear Expenditure and CES and later found the CES utility best fits the
experimental data and all six types of subjects can be described with different range
of parameters of the CES utility function. The CES two-player utility function can be
written as follows:
Us = [apisρ+ (1−a)pioρ](1−ρ),
where a is the degree of selfishness and ρ captures the elasticity of substitution.
A subject would solve his/her utility maximization given the budget constraint pspis+
popio =m, where ps and po are respectively the value of each kept and each given token
respectively; pis and pio are respectively the material payoff of the decision maker and of
another person; m is the token endowment.
In the same vein, Fisman, Kariv & Markovits (2007) employ a series of 50 allocation
decisions and allow for non-linear budget sets so as to classify subjects into four types
including Selfish, Lexself, Social Welfare, and Competitive.
The design of both Andreoni & Miller (2002) and Fisman et al. (2007) contain a
large number of complex allocation decision items with different convex budget sets
and price of giving. Since their design also serve for other research objectives, those
papers specialize on giving protocol and hence, an important distributional preference,
inequality aversion, cannot be identified. Even though their allocations tasks can be
enhanced to identify other types, these tasks would be relatively more complex than
the ones with linear and piece-wise linear utility because of the different values of kept
and given token across allocations. More importantly, the identification process would be
more time-consuming as there is no assumption on the utility function in advance.
In summary, the parametric approach offers a well-constructed theoretical framework
for the identification of a predefined set of social preferences which commonly includes
inequality averse; maximin; efficiency concern and competitive.
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1.2.2 Non-parametric approach
Compared to other approaches, non-parametric one, named as The Equality Equivalence
Test (EET), is relatively new. It is first introduced by Kerschbamer (2015) who aims at
relaxing strong structural assumption when identifying social preference types.
The EET identifies the archetypes using the core features of preference. A decision
maker is given a list of binary choices in two domains: advantageous inequality (i.e.,
the decision maker’s payoff is always higher than the other person’s payoff) and disad-
vantageous inequality (i.e., the decision maker’s payoff is always lower than the other
person’s payoff). In each choice, there is one symmetric and one asymmetric allocation.
The symmetric allocation is also the reference one which is kept constant. In each domain,
the decision maker’s payoff in asymmetric allocations increases while the other person’s
payoff is constant. The decision maker’s preferred allocations would generate the range
of indifference points in each domain. His/her type is then determined by the two sections
of the indifference curve through a reference point: a section passing the advantageous
inequality and a section passing disadvantageous inequality domain.
A basic EET is characterized by four variables: (1) the equal-material-payoff denoted
as e; (2) the “gap" between the other payoff and the equal-material-payoff g; (3) the “step
size" s measuring the difference in one’s own payoff between two consecutive options
in the same domain; (4) the “test size" t measuring the number of steps of size s when
comparing one’s own payoffs across domains. The construction of allocation choices in the
disadvantageous inequality domain is shown in Figure 1.6. The construction of allocation
choices in the advantageous inequality domain is similar: the only difference is the
passive person’s payoff which is e-g instead of e+g.
Figure 1.6: Construction of allocation choices in the disadvantageous inequality domain
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Figure 1.7 presents an example of a symmetric EET designed by Kerschbamer (2015)
in which the above variables are set so that e=10, g=3, s=1 and t=2. The symmetric EET
consists of (4t+2) binary allocations: (2t+1) allocations in each inequality domain.
Figure 1.7: The Kerschbamer (2015)’s EET
Given this design, in each of the domain, rational subjects would switch at most
once from the symmetric to the asymmetric allocation. The switching point in both
domains would convey the information about subjects’ distributional preference types
and preference intensity. For instance, in the disadvantageous inequality domain, a
subject who chooses the asymmetric allocation from the first decision item is benevolent:
he/she is willing to give up 2 euros to increase the other person’s payoff. On the contrary,
if he/she always chooses the symmetric allocation, he/she is strictly malevolent as he/she
is willing to give up their own payoff to reduce the other person’s payoff.
20
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Nine distributional preference types are identified with the EET, including selfish;
altruisic; spiteful; envious; maximin; inequality averse; equality averse; kick-down; kiss-
up. Kerschbamer (2015)’s altruistic preference is equivalent to efficiency concern in
Engelmann & Strobel (2004) and Charness & Rabin (2002) or cooperative in the Ring
test. The envious preference has been studied in Bolton (1991) and in Mui (1995). People
with envy would be malevolent towards those who have higher payoffs and neutrality
towards those who have lower payoffs. The kick-down and kick-up preference are included
only for completeness. Kick-down preference implies malevolence towards those who have
lower payoffs and neutrality towards those who have higher payoffs. In contrast, kiss-up
preference implies benevolence towards those who have higher payoffs and neutrality
towards those who have lower payoffs. Other types are compatible with distributional
preference models discussed previously.
The distributional preference types are determined with a two-dimensional index
(x, y). The x-score measures pro-sociality in the domain of disadvantageous inequality
and equals (t+1.5) points minus the row number in which the decision maker chooses
the asymmetric allocation for the first time. The y-score measures pro-sociality in the
domain of advantageous inequality and equals the row number in which the decision
maker chooses the asymmetric allocation for the first time minus (t+1.5) points. Both
scores range from -2.5 to +2.5 in integer steps. Positive scores imply benevolence while
negative scores implies malevolence. The higher score one has, the more benevolent
he/she is. The magnitude of x and y indicate the preference intensity. The classification
of types in (x,y) space is presented in Figure 1.8.
Figure 1.8: Distribution of types in (x,y) space (Kerschbamer, 2015)
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The most considerable drawback of the EET’s symmetric version is that any type
involving neutrality in benevolence or malevolence cannot be identified exactly or in
Kerschbamer (2015)’s words, can only be identified with "arbitrary precision". Those
types are selfish, maximin, kick-down, envious and kiss-up. For example, subjects who
have x=−12 and y > 0 can be identified as inequality averse; subjects who have x=
1
2 and y >
0 can be identified as altruistic but those who have (x,y) scores lie at the border between
inequality aversion and altruism (x ∈ {−12 ; 12 }; y > 0) can be also identified as maximin.
Notably, those who have x- and y-score equal ±0.5 can be either identified as selfish or
weak form of other types. As Kerschbamer (2015, p.95) stated, researchers then have to
set an ex ante condition in which subjects are classified as selfish.
1.3 Previous experimental evidence
Both identification approaches have been adopted in the lab and in the field. I list
in Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 a number of papers that employ the parametric or the
non-parametric approach by their research question, experimental design and a short
description of the allocation task. I include only lab experimental papers with student
subject pool, incentivized payment and anonymity (i.e., subjects choose an allocation
between him/herself and another participant whom they do not know and will never
meet). Another criterion for the paper inclusion in my review is that social preference
types are elicited under role uncertainty: all subjects make decision in the allocation
task as if they are the decider; they would be randomly assigned a role at the end
of the experiment and one or several allocations would be chosen for payment. I also
exclude papers identifying only two types of preferences such as selfish vs. pro-social or
inequality-averse vs. efficiency-seeking (e.g., Erkal et al., 2011). The chosen papers are
ordered chronologically.
The design of allocation tasks within the realm of the piece-wise linear and CES
utility function varied across studies: (1) the number of allocations ranges from 5 to 64;
(2) each decision item could contain from 2 to 4 options; (3) each decision group could
consist of 2 or 3 persons; (4) the outcome could be either categorical or continuous. This
variation is partly due to the different choice of social preference models and the different
predefined set of social preference types. On the one hand, this diversion would cause the
incomparability of experimental findings across studies. On the other hand, it reflects
the flexibility of the parametric approach: this identification approach can serve any
research objective and any output resolution requirement.
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Table
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Table 1.3 listed papers using the EET. The design of allocation tasks is restricted to
2-person group and a fixed option of an equal share in both disadvantage and advantage
domain. Previous studies have adopted only the symmetric basic version of the EET:
there are 10 allocations with 5 allocations each decision block. Another feature which
stays the same across studies is the resolution of the test which is measured by the
quotient sg = 13 . The only difference among studies is the payment protocol. It is either
the role-uncertainty (i.e., a subject is randomly assigned as decision maker or passive
person, one out of ten allocation decisions chosen by the decision maker will be chosen
for payment) or the double-role-assignment one (i.e., a subject is paid with two allocation
decisions, one as the decision maker and one as the passive person). The reliance on the
symmetric version of the test is apparently to maintain its simplicity.
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Regarding research areas, the parametric approach has been mainly used for two
research objectives: (1) to test theories; (2) to examine the relationship between social
preferences and economic outcomes or other socio-economic characteristics while the
non-parametric method has been adopted for the second research aim or as a control
questionnaire. This is understandable as the parametric approach requires assumption
on utility function and allows for the quantification of utilities, which is particularly
useful for testing specific theories and inducing predictions. Undoubtedly, the main
advantage of the parametric approach is to connect experimental results with theories
while the one of non-parametric one is its simplicity.
An interesting exercise would be to review the distribution of types produced by each
identification method. Due to the restrictive criteria in choosing papers, there are not
enough papers for a thorough quantitative review. Especially, papers which employed
the allocation tasks developed by the parametric approach do not always report the
distribution of social preference types since they only need the continuous measures
of social preferences and do not analyze data at the individual level. Nonetheless, a
comparison among some papers with similar experimental details would still bring about
some insights into the outcomes of each method. Table 1.4 tabulates the results of the
identification of social preference types in those papers.
As can be seen, experimental results have shown that the distribution of types vary
both within and between identification methods. Nevertheless, both methods concur
that the majority of subjects can be defined into the four types: selfish, inequality averse,
efficiency concern and competitive.
Since the EET cannot distinguish between selfish and weak form of other preferences,
there have been three possible alternatives tackling that issue: (1) the selfish type is
eliminated from the analysis (e.g., Balafoutas et al., 2014); (2) subjects of this kind will
be considered as both selfish and other types (e.g., Galeotti & Zizzo, 2016); (3) subjects of
this kind are considered to be selfish (e.g., Mimra & Waibel, 2017). This disagreement on
dealing with selfish type might be the reason for the inconsistency of the distribution of
social preference types.
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In summary, the two aforementioned methods have been used productively in experi-
mental economics for a variety of research objectives. Even though criteria on selecting
reviewed studies does not allow us to have a large number of observations, one certain
issue with the identification of social preference types is that there is absolutely no
agreement in identifying one’s type regardless of the identification approach: the ex-
perimental design, the identified set and the distribution of social preference types all
vary across papers. Each identification method has its own strength: the parametric one
is useful for theory-driven research as subjects behave in line with a utility function
while the non-parametric one’s identification process is simple and fast. The experiment
I present below will clarify how these approaches relatively work and whether there
exists a trade-off between simplicity and accuracy.
1.4 The online experiment
1.4.1 Motivation
Choosing an identification method is potentially problematic and yet, its importance is
underestimated. An example of how the identification method may impact on research
outcome is the difference in findings between He & Villeval (2017) and Balafoulas et
al. (2014). They both examine the revealed social preferences in individual and group
decision-making. Whereas He & Villeval (2017) find no difference in the degree of
disadvantageous and advantageous inequality aversion between individual and group
decision-making, Balafoulas et al. (2014) show that when subjects make allocation in
group, they reveal less inequality averse and spiteful but more efficiency concern. One
of the possible causes for that difference is their adoption of different identification
methods: He & Villeval (2017) use the parametric one while Balafoulas et al. (2014) use
the non-parametric one.
The non-parametric method has been introduced very recently and yet used produc-
tively because it is relatively short and simple. Especially, compared to the parametric
method, it saves researchers a considerable amount of time and effort in the social
preference type identification stage. As mentioned earlier, previous studies seem to
overlook the fact that the EET cannot make a distinction selfish type from the weak form
of other types. This would certainly weaken both explanatory and predictive power of
the estimates, especially when there is ample evidence that the selfish type accounts for
about half of the population (Iriberri & Rey-Biel, 2013). Therefore, it is a must to see how
30
1.4. THE ONLINE EXPERIMENT
subjects who are identified as selfish with the parametric approach are distributed on
the type space built with the EET.
When there are more than one measure for a construct, it is fundamental to question
if they capture a common characteristic or trait. As the parametric method with the
piece-wise linear utility function and the non-parametric method essentially adopt the
same set of distributional preference types, I believe that a systematic comparison
between these two methods, as I undertake in this chapter, would be a valuable addition
to the literature. Specifically, I would examine whether the two methods classify the
same subject into the same category. To do so, I carry out an online experiment on
Prolific Academy in which subjects are asked to complete two allocation tasks: one is
the EET designed by Kerschbamer (2015) (see Figure 1.7); one is designed by Iriberri
& Rey-Biel (2013) (see Figure 1.3). I particularly chose the allocation tasks from those
papers because they both adopt a design with two-person group and, apart from selfish,
subjects in those papers are classified into the similar set of social preference types
including inequality averse, efficiency concern, competitive.
1.4.2 Experimental design
120 British students (69 women and 51 men) from various majors were recruited to
participate in two sessions of a decision-making experiment. Each session includes two
allocation tasks: one designed by Kerschbamer (2015) and one designed by Iriberri &
Rey-Biel (2013). The two sessions differ in the order of the allocation task: in Session 1,
the Kerschbamer (2015)’s allocation task is the first task while in Session 2, Iriberri &
Rey-Biel (2013)’s one is first task. Each session lasted, on average, 10 minutes.
In each allocation task, each subject is asked to choose his/her preferred option to
allocate earnings between him/herself and another participant. We have a measure of all
subjects’ social preferences by using the role-uncertainty protocol: in each allocation task,
each subject chooses a preferred option and they are randomly matched with another
participant and assigned a role as either allocator or recipient. Only one decision item of
the allocator is effective for payment. Subjects are randomly matched with a different
participant in each task while their roles can be the same or different across the two
tasks. The decision items in each task are presented one-at-a-time in random order. Some
studies (e.g., Balafoutas et al., 2014; Galeotti & Zizzo, 2018) provide subjects the whole
10 allocation decisions or 5 allocations in a domain at once and/or ask subjects to indicate
only the allocation decision from which they switch from right to left choice. However,
I employ the randomization of allocation decisions from Balafoutas, Kerschbamer &
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Sutter (2012) which would make consistent choices more difficult to achieve but increase
the robustness of the experimental results.
An example of a decision item in each task is presented in Figure 1.4 and Figure 1.5.
Figure 1.7: An item in Kerschbamer (2015)’s allocation task
Figure 1.8: An item in Iriberri & Rey-Biel (2013)’s allocation task
All values were expressed in tokens and were converted at the end of the experiment
at the rate of 1 pound for 20 tokens. Subjects knew the conversion rate in advance and
were paid on average 1.75 pounds per person which includes 0.84 pounds for participation.
Each subject can only participate in one session.
Before proceeding, it is noteworthy to clarify how the identification of social preference
types work in each method practically.
As stated before, the symmetric EET identifies one’s type by the switching point
in each decision block, meaning the number of allocation in which subjects choose the
unequal share for the first time. Each switching point is equivalent to a given value of x-
or y-score. For example, in the disadvantageous inequality block (decision number 1-5 in
Figure 1.4), the x-score equals to 2.5 if the decision maker always chooses the allocation
on the left (or unequal allocation) and equals to -2.5 if he/she always choose the equal
allocation. The decision maker is then classified into types based on their (x,y) score.
Those who switch preferred choices from the left to the right allocation in each inequality
domain or switch more than once are classified as other types. The identification is thus
rather simple and basically requires econometric-free technique. Figure 1.9 illustrates
the absolute frequency of (x,y)-score after excluding participants who are classified as
other types (33 out of 120 participants).
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Figure 1.9: The absolute frequency of (x,y) score
The identification procedure of the parametric method requires substantially more
time and effort. Iriberri & Rey-Biel (2013) provide a theoretical guidance for the pa-
rameter estimation and type identification. The identification strategy is to apply the
mixture-of-type models into the econometric specifications. Since they are not interested
in the actual individual estimation of the parameters but the population level estima-
tions, they report the results using uniform errors. In the older version of the paper, they
used both logit and uniform specifications of error and found the same type classification.
To show how the parametric method generates both continuous and categorical outcomes,
I would use the logit specification of error for the maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE).
After getting the MLEs of the parameters, I tested if both of them are significantly
different from 0. If they are not, subjects are classified as selfish. Otherwise, their types
are determined by the sign of the parameters: (1) if ρ > 0 and σ> 0, their type is efficiency
concern; (2) if ρ > 0 and σ≤ 0, their type is inequality averse; (3) ρ < 0 and σ< 0, their
type is competitive. Those whose are not identified as one of the above types are grouped
as Others. In Figure 1.10, I plot the estimated ρ and σ of each subject in the subject pool,
excluding those who are classified as other types (5 out of 120 participants)1.
1It should be noted that with the symmetric version of EET we employ here, the parameters of
the piece-wise linear model cannot be estimated since the symmetric choices are the same in all 10
decision items. The two scores, x and y, however, can be translated into the model’s parameter ranges (see
Kerschbamer (2015, p.96) for more details).
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Figure 1.10: The estimated social preference parameters
1.4.3 Results
Figure 1.11 presents the number of individuals that were assigned to each of different
social preference types identified by two methods, ordered by experimental session. For
convenience, we classified those who have x=±0.5 and y=±0.5 as Selfish with the non-
parametric method. We also denote the four types: selfish, inequality averse, efficiency
concern and competitive as Selfish, Fair, Efficiency and Competitive respectively. With
the non-parametric method, the Equality Averse type is also identified.
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Figure 1.11: Distribution of types across sessions
The distribution of types identified with the parametric method is not significantly
different across the two sessions (p > 0.1, chi-squared test) but the one identified with the
non-parametric is. This is partly due to the substantially higher proportion of subjects
unclassified by the non-parametric approach in Session 2.
We pooled the distribution of types of the two sessions together and build a cross
tabulation showing how the two methods categorize the same subjects (see Table 1.5).
The distribution of social preference types identified with the parametric method is
substantially different from the one identified with the non-parametric method. With the
parametric approach, the most popular type is Selfish (43.33%), followed by Efficiency
(27.50%) and Fair (19.17%) whereas according to the EET, the proportion of Selfish
is only 12.50% which is significantly less than the one of Fair (32.50%) and Efficiency
(22.50%).
The reason for the difference in the distribution of social preference types between
the two methods is twofold. First, the EET produced a high number of unclassified
subjects (27.50%). It is understandable as the EET result is highly sensitive to the
switching point in each domain of allocations and hence, a deviation of the right to
the left allocation even in only one decision block would add up the proportion of the
unclassified type. Particularly, in our setting, the randomization of the order of allocations
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would increase the inconsistency of choices. In contrast, there are only 5 subjects whose
type are unidentified using the parametric method.
Second, the Selfish type is not well-identified with the non-parametric method. It
should be reminded that subjects who are classified as Selfish in the EET could have
been identified as having (weak) other-regarding preferences. Yet, they are statistically
demonstrated to be Selfish in the parametric method. Moreover, there are 22 subjects
(16.67%) which are classified as Selfish with the parametric approach but as Fair or
Efficiency with the EET while other 14 Selfish subjects (11.67%) are unclassified with
the EET. In particular, a large proportion of the Fair type (46.15%) identified with the
non-parametric approach are identified as Selfish with the parametric approach. This
could be due to the saliency of the equal-share option in the EET.
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Overall, the non-parametric and parametric method identified the same subjects into
the same type about 46.7% of the time. It is called the observed agreement between the
two methods. The table below presents the kappa test for the inter-rater categorical
agreement of the two methods. The expected agreement shows the percentage of agree-
ment that could occur by chance. However, we reject the hypothesis that the categorical
agreement is random. The kappa statistics value from 1 to -1 with 1 indicating perfect
agreement and -1 indicating perfect disagreement. The kappa value (0.33) indicates a
fair categorical agreement and calls for caution between two identification approaches
as the kappa value for a substantial agreement should be larger than 0.61 (Landis &
Koch, 1977).
Observed agreement Expected agreement Kappa Stand. Error Z Prob>Z
46.67% 20.03% 0.3331 0.0589 5.66 0.0000
Table 1.6: The Kappa test
1.5 Conclusion
Experiments have been using distributive choices to identify social preference types
extensively. Each identification approach has its own advantages and disadvantages.
The parametric method offers a highly flexible design of the allocation task at the cost
of efficiency as it often requires some knowledge of econometrics. Moreover, it is more
suitable in theory-driven research and offers both categorical and continuous measure-
ment of social preferences. The identification process of the non-parametric approach
is more efficient in terms of time and effort. As a result, the parametric approach, es-
pecially with piece-wise linear and CES utility assumption would not be suitable when
the identification of social preferences works as a post-experiment questionnaire or in a
large sample while the non-parametric one could not be used for theory-testing purposes
or when a continuous measurement of social preferences is needed.
In this study, apart from an overview of the identification methods, I implemented
an online experiment, examining the categorical agreement of the two approaches: the
parametric one with piece-wise linear utility function and the non-parametric one with
the symmetric EET. The experimental result shows a fair categorical agreement between
the two methods which means that the difference between the two methods is indeed
problematic. A recommendation for future studies using the non-parametric approach is
to present subjects all of allocation choices in a block at once or to explicitly ask subjects
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about their switching point. In this way, it is easier for subjects to make consistent
choices, reducing the proportion of the unclassified type.
As Kerschbamer (2015) suggest that the discrimination between selfish type and
other types could be more accurate if an asymmetric version of the EET or another
design with higher resolution (lower sg ) is used. Future research should also develop
and implement experiments with other versions of the EET in order to fully evaluate
the performance of the non-parametric approach. In addition, as the non-parametric
approach fails to distinguish the selfish type which plays an vital role in economic studies,
a potential solution is to add a secondary component (e.g., other allocation choices) to
differentiate between the selfish and the weak forms of other types.
In conclusion, the identification of social preference types still appears to be an
unsettled issue. The present review of literature and the experimental evidence on the
categorical agreement between different identification approaches offer some valuable
insights and helpful guide for future works on identifying social preference types in the
lab.
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Appendices: Experiment instructions
Instruction for Task 1
In each decision item, there are two different allocation options in two columns
"Option A" and "Option B". Your task is to choose your preferred option: "Option A"
or "Option B" in each decision item. Your preferred option would be your preferred
distribution of earnings between you and the other person.
At the end of the questionnaire, you will be randomly matched with another partici-
pant and two of you will be randomly assigned into one of the two groups: Group 1 and
Group 2. If you are assigned to Group 1, your decision in this task will become effective
and one of your 10 decisions will be randomly chosen and determine the earnings of
you and your matched partner. If you are assigned to Group 2, your decision will be
ineffective. Your earning thus will be determined by the option chosen by your matched
partner. One of his/her 10 decisions will be randomly selected for payment.
Each decision will be presented in a table like the below example:
In this example, you will choose either Option A in which you receive 14 tokens and
the other person receives 7 tokens or Option B in which you receive 10 tokens and the
other person receives 10 tokens.
The tokens will be converted into pounds at the end, at the rate of 1 pound every 20
tokens.In this task, you will make 10 decisions that affect not only your own earnings
but also the earnings of another person whom you do not know and will never meet.
In each decision item, there are two different allocation options in two columns
"Option A" and "Option B". Your task is to choose your preferred option: "Option A"
or "Option B" in each decision item. Your preferred option would be your preferred
distribution of earnings between you and the other person.
At the end of the questionnaire, you will be randomly matched with another partici-
pant and two of you will be randomly assigned into one of the two groups: Group 1 and
Group 2. If you are assigned to Group 1, your decision in this task will become effective
and one of your 10 decisions will be randomly chosen and determine the earnings of
you and your matched partner. If you are assigned to Group 2, your decision will be
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ineffective. Your earning thus will be determined by the option chosen by your matched
partner. One of his/her 10 decisions will be randomly selected for payment.
Each decision will be presented in a table like the below example:
In this example, you will choose either Option A in which you receive 14 tokens and
the other person receives 7 tokens or Option B in which you receive 10 tokens and the
other person receives 10 tokens.
The tokens will be converted into pounds at the end, at the rate of 1 pound every 20
tokens.
Instruction for Task 2
In each decision item, there are three different allocation options in three columns
"Option A", "Option B" and "Option C". Your task is to choose your preferred option:
"Option A" or "Option B" or "Option C" in each decision item. Your preferred option would
be your preferred distribution of earnings between you and the other person.
At the end of the questionnaire, you will be randomly matched with another par-
ticipant who is different from your matched participant in Part 1. Two of you will be
randomly assigned into one of the two groups: Group 3 and Group 4. If you are assigned
to Group 3, your decision in this task will become effective and one of your 16 decisions
will be randomly chosen and determine the earnings of you and your matched partner. If
you are assigned to Group 4, your decision will be ineffective. Your earning thus will be
determined by the option chosen by your matched partner. One of his/her 16 decisions
will be randomly selected for payment.
Each decision will be presented in a table like the below example:
In this example, you will choose either Option A in which you receive 7 tokens and
the other person receives 10 tokens or Option B in which you receive 7 tokens and the
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other person receives 15 tokens or Option C in which you receive 9 tokens and the other
person receives 12 tokens.
The tokens will be converted into pounds at the end, at the rate of 1 pound every 20
tokens.In this task, you will make 16 decisions that affect not only your own earnings
but also the earnings of another person whom you do not know and will never meet.
In each decision item, there are three different allocation options in three columns
"Option A", "Option B" and "Option C". Your task is to choose your preferred option:
"Option A" or "Option B" or "Option C" in each decision item. Your preferred option would
be your preferred distribution of earnings between you and the other person.
At the end of the questionnaire, you will be randomly matched with another par-
ticipant who is different from your matched participant in Part 1. Two of you will be
randomly assigned into one of the two groups: Group 3 and Group 4. If you are assigned
to Group 3, your decision in this task will become effective and one of your 16 decisions
will be randomly chosen and determine the earnings of you and your matched partner. If
you are assigned to Group 4, your decision will be ineffective. Your earning thus will be
determined by the option chosen by your matched partner. One of his/her 16 decisions
will be randomly selected for payment.
Each decision will be presented in a table like the below example:
In this example, you will choose either Option A in which you receive 7 tokens and
the other person receives 10 tokens or Option B in which you receive 7 tokens and the
other person receives 15 tokens or Option C in which you receive 9 tokens and the other
person receives 12 tokens.
The tokens will be converted into pounds at the end, at the rate of 1 pound every 20
tokens.
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THE WOLF IN SHEEP’S CLOTHING - AN EXPERIMENTAL
ANALYSIS ON SIGNALING SOCIAL PREFERENCES
This paper presents a novel experiment on signaling social preferences. We conducta two-stage experiment to examine whether people manipulate social preferencesupon the observability of these preferences. In the first stage, by a simple distribu-
tion task, subjects are classified into four types including inequality averse, competitive,
efficiency seeking and selfish. Then they play a modified Dictator Game in which recipi-
ents’ choices in the distribution task may be observed by their matched dictators in the
second stage. We found a strong evidence that given the exposure of their preferences,
people strategically employ a certain type of social preferences: selfish recipients sig-
naled themselves as inequality averse aiming at receiving higher offers. These findings
highlight the strategic motive of revealed social preferences and may contribute to the
long-standing discussion on whether people naturally have social preferences or they are
rather gamesmen.
Keywords: social preferences; signaling; distribution task; dictator game
JEL Codes: C91, D63, D64
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Beware of false prophets, which come to you in sheep’s clothing,
but inwardly they are ravening wolves.
_Gospel of Matthew 7:15, King James Version
2.1 Introduction
The present study is inspired by Engelmann & Strobel (2004) in which two critical issues
related to previous studies in social preferences have been addressed. First, studies
on social preferences have usually treated strategic reasoning as confounding effects
or just absent from the experimental design. They believe that strategic reasoning
might change the prominence of social preferences. Yet, there has been no study which
explicitly examines the difference in the distribution of social preferences with and
without strategic thinking.
Second, a tricky issue for both economists and experimentalists is that :“... deviations
from pure selfishness have been interpreted that subjects are better people (i.e., more
altruistic or fair), but maybe they are just better economists" (Engelmann & Strobel,
2004, p.868). This quote refers to an on-going discussion in economics. On the one hand,
the classic economic paradigm posits that people act out of their own self-interest which
got support from both human history and empirical studies (e.g., Alesina, Baqir, &
Easterly, 1999; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005; Miguel & Gugerty, 2005). On the other hand,
there has been a series of evidences in economic experiments in which subjects have
been found to give up their own’s payoffs to attain a more efficient or more equitable
allocation of payoffs among themselves. Engelmann & Strobel (2004) has suggested a
bridge between the two views: people may behave nicely for their own benefit. Empirical
work that sheds light on this conjecture will be definitely of great value.
This paper would delve into the aforementioned issues. We integrate strategic reason-
ing into the social preference elicitation and compare the distribution of social preferences
with and without strategic reasoning. Under the assumption of the stability of social
preferences, the strategic situation is created with the observability of these preferences.
We conduct a two-stage experiment including an one-shot distribution task (DT) in
the first stage and Dictator Game (DG) in the second stage. We interpret the choices made
in the DT as a signal of the players’ social preferences, and classify subjects into four
categories: inequality averse (i.e., those who choose the most egalitarian distribution of
payoffs), competitive (i.e., those who are interested in minimizing unfavorable inequality
and in maximizing favorable payoffs), efficiency seeker (i.e., those who are interested in
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maximizing the total sum of payoffs) and selfish (i.e., those who are only interested in
maximizing their own payoffs). The DG is a binary game that excludes any form of direct
reciprocity or strategic uncertainty, but where the decision maker- the Dictator- has to
cope with a tradeoff between his pocketbook interest and his social preferences such as
inequality aversion or altruism. In this setting, we predict that upon the observability of
recipients’ types before dictators make offer, each type of recipients will have different
behavioral patterns: some recipients may consciously “change" their preferred option
in DT and signal as other types so as to receive higher offer in DG. For brevity, our
research question would be:“Would people strategically reveal a certain type of social
preferences?"
To my knowledge, this is the first experiment in which a distributive choice is treated
as a signaling device on economic decision-making context. The signal senders (i.e.,
recipients in DG) will manipulate the signal if they believe that the signal receivers (i.e.,
dictators in DG) will reason their decision based on those signals. This study is then
also related to the theoretical literature on psychological games, in which players have
belief-dependent preferences (e.g., Geanakoplos, Pearce & Stacchetti, 1989; Battigalli &
Dufwenberg, 2008).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, the most closely related
literature to our research is reviewed. The experimental design and behavioral predic-
tions are presented in Section 3. Next, the results are discussed in Section 4. The last
section concludes and suggests potential enhancement and extension of our study.
2.2 Literature Review
It has been widely accepted that beliefs directly affect one’s utility, not just his/her
material final outcomes since Geanakoplos, Pearce & Stacchetti (1989) introduce their
model in which the decision makers are belief-dependently motivated and incorporating
beliefs into the utility function. Based on their work, a considerable number of studies
have presented models of belief-dependent preferences. One of the most remarkable
papers is Battigalli & Dufwenberg (2009) which generalize Geanakoplos et al. (1989) to
construct a framework of belief dependent motivation to capture psychological effects
such as reciprocity, regret or anxiety on decision making process: individuals’ belief about
themselves and their partners would determine their behaviors towards others and once
a belief on others’ intention is founded, individuals would not change it.
A variety of experimental evidence supports the importance of the belief-dependent
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preferences. Dufwenberg & Gneezy (2000) measure beliefs in the lost wallet game and
the DG. The same behavioral pattern of giving is found in both game: one’s offer is
positively correlated to his belief on others’ expectation of the offer as the wallet owner
in the lost wallet game and the Dictator in the DG do not want to let his partner down by
giving him less than his expectation. This is in line with the framework of Geanakoplos
et al. (1989).
In the same vein, Dana, Cain & Dawes (2006) introduce a version of DG with an
exit choice: given a 10$ endowment, a significant number of dictators were willing
to take 9$ and left the game to eliminate recipients’ expectation on their offers and
also avoid appearing selfish. It means that apart from monetary interest, people are
also motivated to make a decision that they think that others expect them to make
even in a non-strategic setting. Thus, the lack of transparency between the beliefs
about dictator’s actions and the beliefs about recipient’s reactions would deteriorate
generosity. Similarly, Broberg, Ellingsen & Johannesson (2007) find that roughly two-
thirds of participants were willing to accept the dictator-exit option, giving up part of
their endowment to avoid sharing. The findings of both Dana et al. (2006) and Broberg
et al. (2007) have provided experimental evidences for the belief-dependent utility
introduced by Battigalli & Dufwenberg (2009): if the Dictator is adequately sensitive to
the Recipient’s expectation, he will conform her behavior to that expectation but he is
also willing to pay a price to lower the Recipient’s expectation and avoid showing selfish.
Both aforementioned studies pointed out one important motivation in economic
decision making which is to avoid letting others down. Charness & Dufwenberg (2006)
define this motivation as guilt aversion and successfully incorporate it into the utility
function. By doing so, they persuasively rationalize the impact of communication on trust
and cooperation in trust game as communication brings about messages which can induce
commitment: cooperation is much higher if the message contains a statement of promise
than otherwise. Other evidences on the importance of belief-dependent preferences can
be found in the field experiments (Andreoni et al., 2011) and in a large-scale newspaper
dictator game (Ockenfels & Werner, 2012).
These above studies do concur on a principle that beliefs and beliefs about others’
beliefs directly enter the utility function, which captures the concern about others’
expectation on one’s own behavior. As such, there may be other important motives of
revealing a type of social preferences rather than a concern for fairness or others’ welfare,
especially when one’s social preference is transparent to others. Chmura et al. (2005)
explicitly examine the role of beliefs on social preferences using coordination game by
46
2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW
comparing the likelihood of a successful coordination on a Pareto superior distribution
and the one of an equal distribution. They pointed out that the larger difference in
subjects’ payoff would lead to the less coordination, which supports the model of inequity
aversion. Interestingly, subjects reason their strategy using their anticipation of other
subjects’ choices and what really drives a decision maker is their belief that their partner
has a certain kind of preference, not their own preference.
Theoretical studies have successfully modeled the evolution of a certain type of social
preferences as signaling device. The first attempt to model signaling of social preferences
is probably Frank (1987) which aims at characterizing non-rational behaviors in a
utility function without violating utility maximization motive. The most critical point
in Frank (1987)’s model is that tastes are endogenously determined and hence, Frank’s
utility function could be used to rationalize people’s concern for fairness, anger and
vengeance when those tastes work as a commitment device. A more explicit study is
Levine (1997) where altruistic and spiteful acts are arisen with signaling effect under the
ordinary assumptions of game theory and the incomplete information about preference
characteristics. However, Levine’s model departs from the traditional economic theory in
the specification of utility function: people do not only care about their own monetary
payoffs but also their opponent’s. A player’s action would send a pre-play message to
signal how altruistic he is and his opponent would take reaction based on that signal.
Examined quantitatively on experimental results of several repeated games such as
ultimatum, centipede and public good game, Levine’s model fits observations quite well,
especially in comparison with the model with only selfish agents, which then affirms the
vital role of the signaling of types.
Most recently, Golman (2015) introduces a model of social preferences which char-
acterizes many motives including altruism, spitefulness, reciprocity and social images.
Under the assumption that people want others to like them, Golman (2015) claims that
people are incentivized to signal their social preferences, more precisely, their degree of
altruism, spitefulness and reciprocity through actions or direct communication, which
then affect their own and others’ utilities. Golman (2015) proves that altruistic people
want others know that they are altruistic while spiteful ones want others to be aware
of their spitefulness. An important implication of this model is that individuals may
actually reveal their social preferences so as to communicate to their partners, which can
be used to explain several puzzling experimental results such as dictator game giving,
gift giving or voluntary contribution in public good game. A noteworthy point is that in
our study, the motivation of signaling social preference is not to create social images as
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in Golman (2015) but in a pure strategic context.
Little is known about signaling social preferences in the lab. The most closely related
paper to ours is Fehrler & Przepiorka (2013) which treats altruism as unobservable but
signal-able quality of subjects. They conducted experiments in which an altruistic act
is manifested by charity giving and their predictions rest on two hypotheses: (1) people
who perform charity giving are more trustworthy; (2) in comparison between people
who perform charity giving and who do not, donors are trusted more. The experiment
is designed in such a way that before committing in a social exchange, a player can
observe his opponent’s action revealing his opponent’s altruism (i.e., charitable giving).
In the lab, players are asked to play a dictator game and an exchange game afterwards.
Experimental results support for both stated hypotheses as altruistic acts (e.g., charity
giving) can compensate cooperators with signaling benefits through social exchange
insofar as the benefit from sending signal is positive. Nevertheless, there can be other
explanations on their experimental results (i.e., kin or multi-level selection) rather than
the signaling benefit of an altruistic act only. An underlying difference between Fehrler
& Przepiorka (2013) and our study is that they focus only on signal receivers’ decisions
while contrastingly, we would also examine the ones of signal senders with all four
different signals.
Gambetta & Przepiorka (2014) also consider social preferences as strategic signals:
they compare the signaling effect of a generous choice when it is made naturally or
strategically. Subjects will play a DG followed by a Trust Game under two conditions:
(1) Trustees make decision in the DG without any knowledge about the Trust Game; (2)
Trustees make decision in the DG knowing that they can reveal or conceal or lie about
their decision in the DG to Trustors. They posit that trustors condition their decision in
the Trust Game on Trustees’ choice in the DG. Knowing this, most Trustees who have
made a "not generous" decision in the DG lie about it. Nevertheless, trustors behave also
strategically in how they handle the information: a generous choice made naturally by
uninformed trustees and reliably revealed is more effective than a generous choice that
could be strategic, which highlights the reliability of the signal display.
In this study, we conjecture that sending information about this preferred option in
the DT is a signal of one’s type of social preferences and a form of communication about
one’s expectation. These signals may be credible and sending a certain signal but not
others may be a strategic decision. The present research would entail a rigorous test
on these issues: whether and how people change the signal of their social preferences
strategically under the observability of these preferences.
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2.3 Experimental Design
The aim of the present experimental design is twofold. First, the design is meant to test
whether the observability of social preferences entails a strategic manipulation of social
preferences’ types. Second, if this strategic manipulation of social preferences holds,
do people really condition their decision on the signal they receive? Three tasks in the
experiment are introduced, and then three treatments are described below.
In all treatments, subjects take part in three monetarily-incentivized tasks including
a distribution task (DT), a modified Dictator Game (DG) and a guessing game (GG).
The DT is designed to elicit subjects’ social preferences. Specifically, the DT presents
subjects with four different allocations of payoff between three persons (the subject
him/herself and two other participants), of which the subject has to choose one. Each
option corresponds to one of the four social types as tabulated in Table 2.1. Subjects
would see only the allocation options but not the corresponding types.
Option Allocator Recipient 1 Recipient 2 Type
A 160 160 160 Fair
B 160 130 340 Efficient
C 190 40 250 Selfish
D 170 65 65 Competitive
Table 2.1: Options of distribution and the corresponding type of social preferences
We link the four alternatives to four social preference types using the inequality
aversion model of Fehr & Schmidt (1999).
Ui = xi−αi 1n−1Σ j 6=imax[x j− xi,0]−βi
1
n−1Σ j 6=imax[xi− x j,0],
where xi is the material payoff of player i, αi measure player i’s disutility of having
less than player j (often called envy parameter) and βi measure player i’s disutility of
having more than player j (often called guilt parameter). Notice that we relax Fehr &
Schmidt (1999)’s constraint on the parameters so that the four types of social preferences
are captured in the model by parameter restrictions tabulated in Table 2.2.
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Type Parameter restrictions
Fair 27 < β < 1 and α ≥ β or
2
21 < β ≤ 27 and α > 12 (2-5.β)
Efficient 37 < β < 1 and α <
−β
6 or
0 ≤ β ≤ 37 and α < 12 (-1+2.β)
Selfish α = β =0
Competitive β ≤ −23 and α > 0 or−2
3 < β < 0 and α > 13 .(2+3.β)
Table 2.2: Parameter restrictions of types
The four alternatives are illustrated on the subjects’ screens, by means of a bar plot
(see Figure 2.1). The order of which the four alternatives were presented was randomized
to avoid any conceivable influence of a preference for the center or right allocation
(Engelmann & Strobel, 2004). Subjects were informed that at the end of the experiment,
each subject would be randomly matched with other two participants and randomly
assigned a role as “Allocator", “Recipient 1" or “Recipient 2". Only the choice of the
participant selected as “Allocator" mattered.
50
2.3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Figure 2.1: Screen shot of the distribution task
In the DG, subjects are randomly assigned as recipients or dictators. In our version
of DG, there are 200 tokens on the table, the dictator can decide to give X tokens to the
recipient and keep 200-X (tokens) for his/herself while the recipient has no opportunity
to reject the offer. Accordingly, payments are finalized.
The GG is the same in all three treatments: subjects are asked to guess the option in
the DT which is chosen by the majority of subjects in the session. If their guess is correct,
they will earn 40 tokens.
There are three different treatments: (1) Revise; (2) ExanteSend; (3) ExpostSend. In
Revise treatment, participants do DT then their role in DG is announced. Before playing
DG, recipients are told that in DG, their choices made in the DT will be revealed to their
matched partner and they are given a chance to revise their choices. Both dictators and
recipients are told that with a probability of 0.5, the observed choice is the revised one
and with a probability of 0.5, the observed choice is the recipients’ choice before revision.
dictators will make decision in the DG after observing recipients’ choices (hereinafter
as conditional DG). This treatment is used to test the within-subject variation of social
preference type due to the disclosure of types.
The next two treatments would be used for examining the difference in the distri-
bution of social preference types between subjects who send signal and subjects who
do not send signal about their types. In ExanteSend treatment, before doing the DT,
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participants are provided the instructions and their roles in the DG. Besides, recipients
are asked whether they want to send the information about their choices to dictators in
the second stage. If yes, their choices would be given to the dictators before the dictators
make offer (i.e., conditional DG). Otherwise, dictators will make decision without any
information (hereinafter as unconditional DG). After all recipients made decision, all
participants do the DT and afterwards, the DG.
The ExpostSend treatment only differs from the ExanteSend treatment in the order
of the Send option. In ExpostSend treatment, participants first do the DT. After they
complete, they are introduced the DG and assigned as a recipient or a dictator. recipients
are then asked whether they want to send the information about their choices to dictators
in the second stage. If yes, participants play the conditional DG. Otherwise, they would
play the unconditional DG.
Notice that in any treatment, both recipients and dictators will do the DT so that
the dictators can fully understand how the choices of recipients are elicited and their
implications.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that there is no strategic interaction in either
the DT or the DG itself. The DG is defined as a decomposed game1 commonly used to
elicit intrinsic preferences (Murphy & Ackermann, 2011). Yet, our experimental design
allows us to disentangle strategic interaction from outcome-equalizing transfers as well
as any reciprocity motive: we use a perfect-stranger procedure in which it is emphasized
that the matched partners of a subject in DT will be definitely different from their
matched partner in DG and subjects are paid for both tasks but will not receive any
feedback or payment until the end of the experimental session. In this way, the strategic
manipulation was captured by our experimental design without any confounding effect,
especially reciprocity between subjects and other participants to whom they interact in
the DT and they are matched with in the DG.
The study was conducted in April, May and December 2017 at the Computable
and Experimental Economics Lab (CEEL) at the University of Trento using z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). The experiment involved 162 students the University of Trento
recruited through an online recruitment software. The number of subjects in the Revise,
ExanteSend and ExpostSend treatments are respectively 60, 54 and 48.
Due to the difference in the number of decisions made by recipients and dictators in
DG, participants were seated in two different rooms in order to eliminate any “unfit"
1A decomposed game is basically a choice task in which preference considerations are decoupled from
strategic considerations.
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action which may cause confusion to the subjects. Upon arrival, subjects were randomly
assigned a number and accordingly, a cubicle in one of the two rooms. A paper copy of
the instruction for Task 1 or the DT (see Appendix A) was distributed, read by each
subject in private and then read aloud to assure common knowledge. Subjects had the
opportunity to ask questions, which were answered in private. They are told that the
experiment includes two stages; at the end of Task 1, they would receive instructions for
Task 2 (i.e., the DG) and at the end of Task 2, they would receive instruction for Task 3
(i.e., the GG), directly on their computer screen. Subjects were explicitly asked not to
communicate in any way with other participants until the end of the study.
The experiment started as soon as all subjects in both rooms fully understood the
first task and the experimental procedure. Each session ended with a questionnaire. A
session lasted, on average, 40 minutes. All values were expressed in tokens and were
converted at the end of the experiment at the rate of 1 Euro for 40 tokens. Subjects knew
the conversion rate in advance and were paid privately their earnings plus a show-up
fee of 3 euros. Subjects earned, on average, 7.2 euros which excludes a show-up fee of 3
euros. A total of 6 sessions (2 sessions each treatment) were conducted.
2.4 Behavioral predictions
Under conventional assumptions of selfishness and rationality, both the revise and send
option are ineffective. Dictators offer nothing to recipients. Recipients, anticipating this,
always choose the selfish option to earn the highest payoffs. As such, recipients will not
revise their options and there will be no difference in the distribution of types between
those who send the signal and those who does not.
Assume subjects have a belief-dependent utility function (Battigalli & Dufwenberg,
2009), a Dictator’s objective function is as follows.
U ≡E−m−θ. |µ−m |,
where E is the endowment of the DG, m is the dictator’s offer to the recipient, µ is the
dictator’s belief on the recipient’s expected offer and θ ≥ 0 is a constant that measures the
psychological sensitivity to the recipient’s expectation. θ is assumed to be heterogeneous
in the population.
The Dictator would make an offer which equals to his belief about the Recipient’s
expectation if and only if
E−µ≥E−m−θ. |µ−m | or equivalently, θ ≥ 1
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In words, the Dictator will conform his/her behavior to the Recipient’s expectation if
she/he is sensitive enough. Recipients are assumed to have a distribution of probability of
expected offers and dictators would form belief about the mean of recipients’ expectation
which is at most half of the endowment (i.e., no-more-than-half constraint (Dufwenberg
and Gneezy, 2000)).
Each option in the DT is a signal on one’s preference which then contains a statement
on his/her expected offer in the DG. Under the no-more-than-half constraint, both Selfish
and Competitive signal are not effective as they imply an expectation for having more
than half or the entire endowment. Between Fair and Efficient, the first reveals a concern
for relative payoffs and contains a straightforward statement of a fair-share expectation
while the second only reveals an expectation for any positive offer. Notice that dictators
also play the DT so they are completely aware of the difference among the four allocations.
If the Recipient send signal as being Fair, the Dictator would believe that the Recipient’s
expectation, given his belief of being matched with a sensitive enough Dictator, is to
receive a 50% share of the endowment. Hence, on average, we conjecture that in the
conditional DG, dictators will offer more to those who signals as Fair.
Prediction 1: Recipients who signal as Fair receive higher offer than others.
In terms of recipients’ behaviors, on the one hand, we predict that recipients will
manipulate the Revise or Send option, sending a message which they believe is the
most effective one. On the other hand, they only change their types to send a different
signal if and only if the expected payoffs in the DG compensates the loss caused by
choosing an option inconsistent with their preferences. We conjecture that there are
both within-subject and between-subject variation in the distribution of types given the
observability of Recipients’ choice in the DT. We have the following predictions:
Prediction 2: In the Revise treatment, a significant number of non-fair recipients revise
their choices in the DT in order to signal as Fair.
Prediction 3: In the ExanteSend and ExpostSend treatment, the distribution of dis-
closed types is significantly different from the one of concealed types.
2.5 Results
We first present the results of the DT. The distribution of types without any strategic rea-
soning can be obtained from the Revise (before revision), the ExpostSend treatment and
the distribution of dictators’ types in the ExanteSend treatment. Since the distribution
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of types without strategic reasoning is consistent across treatments (p > 0.1, chi-squared
tests), we pooled the data and obtained the result illustrated in Figure 2.2. The most and
the least common type are Selfish and Competitive respectively while the two types Fair
and Efficient together account for more than 50% of the sample.
Figure 2.2: Distribution of types without strategic reasoning (N=135)
Next, the within- and between-subject variation of social types due to strategic
reasoning will be shown respectively.
RESULT 1: Given the exposure of types, a significant number of recipients changed
their choices and signaled as either Fair or Efficient.
Support for Result 1 is found in Figure 2.3 which illustrates the within-subject
variation of recipients and dictators before and after their social types are disclosed in
the Revise treatment. There are 11 out of 30 recipients who changed their choices: 7 out
of 10 Selfish ones signaled as either Fair (2) or Efficient (5); 3 out of 12 Efficient ones
signaled as Fair and particularly, 1 out of 7 Fair recipients signaled as Selfish. Therefore,
subjects revised their choices to signal as either Fair or Efficient. This variation is
statistically significant (p < 0.1, mid-p McNemar test).
Recall that in the Revise treatment, recipients are asked to revise their choices in
the DT before dictators make decision while dictators are asked to revise choices after
they made their offers to recipients. The comparison between the variation in recipients’
and dictators’ types is a finer check on whether this variation is driven by pure strategic
reasoning or also by social image concern. We can confirm that our design allows us to
disentangle strategic reasoning from social image concern because among 30 dictators,
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of types before and after revise option
only 5 subjects changed their choices, surprisingly in an opposite dimension compared to
that of recipients: 1 Fair and 3 Efficient dictators chose a Selfish option when given the
revise option; only 1 Competitive changed to Fair option.
The ExanteSend and ExpostSend treatment will bring more insight into whether
people perceive social preferences as strategically relevant and hence, manipulate these
preferences.
RESULT 2: Compared to Fair and Efficient recipients, Competitive and Selfish ones
are less likely to send the information about their types to their matched dictators.
Support for Result 2 can be derived from Table 2.3 and Table 2.4. Table 2.3 summa-
rizes the distribution of recipients’ types across treatments with the Send option.
As can be seen, in the ExanteSend treatment, signals are only either Fair or Efficient
whereas more than half of recipients who did not send signal were classified as Selfish,
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Treatment #obs Fair Efficient Selfish Competitive
ExanteSend
All 27 13 6 6 2
(42.59%) (20.37%) (29.63%) (7.41%)
Sent 16 10 6
(59.26%) (62.50%) (37.50%)
Not Sent 11 3 6 2
(40.74%) (27.27%) (54.55%) (18.18%)
ExpostSend
All 24 11 8 3 2
(29.17%) (22.92%) (39.58%) (8.33%)
Sent 20 10 8 1 1
(83.33%) (50%) (40%) (5%) (5%)
Not Sent 4 1 2 1
(16.67%) (25%) (50%) (25%)
Table 2.3: Distribution of types in ExanteSend and ExpostSend treatment
only 27.27% of them is Fair and none is Efficient. In the same manner, among 20 signalers
in the ExpostSend treatment, 90% of them are Fair and Efficient while the majority of
those who did not send signal is Selfish and Competitive. This difference adheres to the
effect of the observability of types upon the Send option: the distribution of disclosed
types is significantly different from the one of concealed types in both ExanteSend and
ExpostSend treatment (p < 0.05, chi-squared test). The majority of signal senders (more
than 80% in both treatments) claimed that they sent the information as they believed
their partners would make offer based on this information in the post-experiment
questionnaire.
Table 2.4 tabulates the logit regressions on the probability of sending signals, con-
trolling for the recipients’ types (Efficient, Selfish and Competitive), the HEXACO-Pi-R
scales2, individual characteristics including gender, field of study and age as well as
whether recipients had the ex ante or ex post Send option (1 = ex ante). The regression re-
sults suggest that compared to Fair recipients, both Selfish and Competitive type are less
likely to send information about their types to their partners. Interestingly, among the
HEXACO-Pi-R scales, the Honesty-Humility score reflect one’s willingness to manipulat-
ing others for personal gain: people with high scores on the Honesty-Humility scale avoid
2The HEXACO Personality Inventory-Revised is an instrument that assesses the six major dimen-
sions of personality including Honest-Humility, Emotionality, eXtraversion, Agreeableness versus Anger,
Conscientiousness and Openness to Experience.
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manipulating others for personal gain. It is thus reasonable when the Honesty-Humility
score has a negative effect on the probability of sending signal.
Table 2.4: Logit regression of sending signals
An underlying result is that the order of the Send option also has a significant effect:
the probability of sending is higher if recipients cope with the Send option after they
already made decision on the DT. It seems to be counterintuitive as it means that people
are less likely to signal when they can decide which signal to be sent than when they
cannot. Nevertheless, we can rationalize subjects’ behaviors by incorporating the concept
of commitment in experiment: the types of subjects were already exposed as soon as
they made their decision and hence, participants are more willing to send signal in the
ExpostSend treatment.
RESULT 3: When types are disclosed, the proportion of Fair and Efficient is much
higher while the proportion of Selfish and Competitive is smaller.
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At the aggregate level, the tendency of signaling either Fair or Efficient is even
more substantial when we pool the data of all three treatments and compare the two
distributions of types between those whose signals are observed and those whose signals
are unobserved (see Figure 2.4). The chi-squared test result indicates a very strong
evidence of the significant difference between these two distributions (p < 0.01).
Figure 2.4: Distributions of disclosed and concealed recipients’ types (N=81)
Since any variation on recipients’ choices in the DT arises from recipients’ belief on
dictators’ behaviors in the DG, it is critical to examine whether dictators condition their
offers on recipients’ signals. Notice that the conditional DG in the Revise treatment and
the other two treatments are different because in the Revise treatment, dictators know
that the signals they received may be manipulated while in the other treatments, signals
are genuine. Hence, to distinguish between the two kinds of conditional DG, we named
the one in the Revise treatment as Revise DG.
RESULT 4: Recipients who signaled as Efficient are offered less than recipients who
signaled as Fair and who did not send any signal.
Table 2.5 which summarizes the average DG offers across types3 and treatments4.
3Recipients’ types in the Revise treatment are the ones actually observed by their matched dictators,
which may be either the original or revised choice.
4The DG results in the ExanteSend and ExpostSend treatment are pooled.
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Types #obs Fair Efficient Selfish Competitive Mean
Revise DG
recipients 30 48.89 43.42 51.88 0 45.87
(n=9) (n=12) (n=8) (n=1)
dictators 30 52.5 43.63 16.1 100 45.87
(n=7) (n=12) (n=10) (n=1)
Conditional DG
recipients 36 47.75 24.29 75 80 40.28
(n=20) (n=14) (n=1) (n=1)
dictators 36 37 48.33 37.06 53.33 40.28
(n=10) (n=6) (n=17) (n=3)
Unconditional DG
recipients 15 78.75 51.25 30 54.33
(n=4) (n=8) (n=3)
dictators 15 46.67 50 53.33 95 54.33
(n=3) (n=3) (n=8) (n=1)
Table 2.5: Mean offers (tokens)
On average, dictators offered about 40.95 tokens or equivalently, 22.48% of the
endowment. There were 34.47% of pure gamesman who offered nothing and 13.58%
dictators who made an equal share offer. These observations are consistent with those of
the previous studies (e.g., Engel, 2011). The average offers across different settings are
not significantly different (p >0.1, t-tests).
In the Revise DG, there is no evidence on how dictators condition their offers on
recipients’ types (p-value > 0.1, t-tests). An explanation for this ineffectiveness of signals
is because recipients’ types may not be genuine: a Fair signal, given the revise option, is
no longer credible. Since dictators question the truthfulness of the signal they received,
their decision will not be influenced by that signal. According to Gambetta & Przepiorka
(2014), signal receivers are even more careful in relying their decision on positive
signals like Fair or Efficient. Hence, the credibility of the signal would cloud the impact
of signaling one’s social preferences and the ineffectiveness of signals in the Revise
treatment shows that recipients, unlike our assumptions, fail to anticipate the response
of dictators.
In the Conditional and Unconditional DG, we found: (1) dictators offer significantly
less when recipients signaled as Efficient than when they did not receive any signal
(p<0.1, t-test) ; (2) dictators offer significantly less when recipients signaled as Efficient
than when they signaled as Fair (p< 0.1, t-test). About other types, we do not have enough
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observations since very few recipients disclosed their types as Selfish or Competitive.
In summary, our experimental results provide conclusive evidence that social prefer-
ences are considered to be a strategic factor in decision making: recipients are less likely
to expose their types if their signals are Selfish or Competitive. They also strategically
manipulate the information about their type of social preferences: (1) the distribution of
types when recipients know beforehand their types are observed is significantly different
from the one when they do not know that; (2) only Selfish type changes their choices in
order to signal as Efficient and Fair.
2.6 Conclusion
We set up a laboratory experiment involving a distribution task and a Dictator Game to
test the empirical implication of signaling the social-preference types. We employ the fact
the idea of belief-dependent motivation on economic decision making: any information or
message one sends to the others will contain a statement of his/her expectation and if
people are are sensitive enough, they will conform others’ expectation. Our experimental
results show that subjects understand the link between their signal of social preference
types and others’ belief about their expectation and use it appropriately in order to gain
higher benefit: recipients whose type of social preferences observable mainly signaled as
either Fair or Efficient. We confirm Gambetta & Przepiorka (2014)’s conclusion on the
existence of strategic thinking on signaling even in an artificial setting with low stakes.
We have proposed and tested a strategic motive of revealing social preferences. It
should be noted that by all means, we do not neglect the presence of people naturally
having social preferences. Quite the opposite: without strategic reasoning, about 50%
of people have other-regarding preferences (i.e., inequality averse and efficiency seek-
ing). However, our study also reinstates the selfishness in human economic behaviors
and confirms the conjecture of Engelmann & Strobel (2004): the presence of strategic
reasoning does change the relative importance of distributional preferences.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Experiment instructions (translated from Italian)
Welcome! This is a study of economic decision making. The study includes three tasks
and a questionnaire. After completing a task, you will participate the next task and
earn more money. All tasks will be computerized. We will now provide you with the
instructions for Task 1. At the end of Task 1, you will receive instructions for Task 2,
directly on your computer screen. Instructions for Task 3 will be provided only at the
end of Task 2. In all instructions, we will always provide you true information that never
deceives you in any way.
Participants in this session have been randomly allocated to this room or another
room. All participants in both rooms are now reading the same instructions. In Task 1
and 2, you will be randomly matched with other participants. In Task 3, you will not be
matched with anyone. If you are matched with a participant in Task 1, for sure you will
not be matched with him or her again in Task 2.
The choices made by each participant will be confidential unless explicitly specified.
Anonymity will be maintained both during and after the study: your identity will not be
made known to any participant at any time.
You will have the opportunity to earn tokens in each of the three tasks. The tokens
you earn in each task cumulate and will be converted into Euro at the end, at the rate of
1 Euro every 40 tokens. You will also receive 3 euros for showing up in this study. The
money you earn will be paid to you in private, and in cash, at the end of the study.
Instruction for Task 1
In this task, you will be matched with two other participants, chosen at random
among those in this room. We will denote the other two participants in your group as
“Person 1" and “Person 2". Your task is to choose your preferred allocation of tokens
among you and the other two participants in your group. You can choose between four
options:
A. You earn 160 tokens, Person 1 earns 160 tokens and Person 2 earns 160 tokens.
B. You earn 160 tokens, Person 1 earns 130 tokens and Person 2 earns 340 tokens.
C. You earn 190 tokens, Person 1 earns 40 tokens and Person 2 earns 250 tokens.
D. You earn 170 tokens, Person 1 earns 65 tokens and Person 2 earns 65 tokens.
At the end of the study, one person in each group will be randomly selected and
her/his choices will define her/his earnings and those of the other two in the group. If
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you are randomly selected, the option you choose in Task 1 will become effective and
determine your payoff and the payoff of other two participants in your group. If you are
not selected and assigned as “Person 1" or “Person 2", your decision will be ineffective.
Your payoff thus will be determined by the option chosen by the selected participant in
your group and by the role you are assigned (Person 1 or Person 2).
We ask you to turn off your phone now and not to communicate in any way with the
people present in the room until the end of the study. If you have any question, please
raise your hand and we will assist you in private. You are free to leave the study if you
want to, however, you will not receive any sum of money.
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Appendix B: Decision screens
Figure 2.5: An example of Dictators’ decision screen when Recipients’ types are disclosed
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A unifying theme in the literature on organizations is the importance of workers’pro-social motivation on effort provision: in a task yielding a pro-social outcome,effort levels of pro-socially motivated workers under no incentive pay contract
can approach those generated by high powered piece-rate contract. This suggests that
employers could save monetary incentives by attaining the information about their work-
ers’ pro-sociality to make an optimal compensation scheme offer. Our study examines
if employers are able to make use of workers’ pro-social motivation in a profitable way.
Using a classic principal-agent setting, we present the first experimental evidence on
how employers’ and workers’ pro-sociality have effect on employers’ contract decision
and profit.
Keywords: Pro-social motivation; Warm-glow and pure altruism; Real-effort task; Char-
ity giving
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CHAPTER 3. MANIPULATING PRO-SOCIALLY MOTIVATED WORKERS
3.1 Introduction
Among the substantive issues in labor economics that have been addressed by means of
lab experiments, the most important contribution is the integration social preference into
workers’ motivation (Dohmen, 2014). There has been a great deal of research studying
the role of workers’ pro-social motivation (i.e., the desire to exert effort to benefit others)
for the design of incentive contracts, the selection of workers, the provision of effort
and organizational design (see Charness & Kuhn (2011) for a review). These studies do
concur on two underlying findings: (1) compared to non pro-social workers, pro-social
ones provide more effort in pro-social task (i.e., a task yielding an outcome that benefits
others); (2) pro-social workers require less monetary compensation. This suggests to
both non-profit and for-profit organizations that they could take advantage of their
workers’ pro-social incentives by making the workers’ effort tied directly to their pro-
social motivation.
While the vast majority of research has focused on the effect of pro-social motivation
on workers’ behavior and optimal incentive design, little is known about how employers
handle their workers’ pro-sociality. In real-world labor relationship, employers usually
have access to an employee’s personal information and pro-sociality proxies even before
recruiting them (e.g., a track record of extra-circular activities and charity activities
on employee’s CV). Yet, they can make two possible mistakes: (1) they fail to initiate
pro-social motivation and thus, fail to take advantage of their pro-social workers; (2) they
mistakenly offer a pro-social compensation scheme to non pro-social workers. Whether
employers make those mistakes or successfully exploit pro-socially motivated workers
remains ambiguous as little research has explicitly explored employers’ reaction towards
pro-social motivation at work.
In the lab, Dictator Game has been commonly used to measure one’s pro-sociality.
The recipient in the DG can be either a deserving entity (e.g., charity, NGOs) or another
unknown participant. Prior experimental studies have only used the donation to the
former one as a proxy of participants’ pro-sociality (e.g., Fehrler & Kosfeld (2014); Banuri
& Keefer (2016); Tonin & Vlassopoulos (2010)). Even though this measure can closely
capture social preferences of workers in non-profit sector, it does not provide the full
picture of workers’ pro-social motivation: a worker’s effort provision is also driven by
his/her concern about other people like his employers. Both dimensions of workers’ pro-
sociality, hence, should be examined to establish a link between pro-social motivation
and effort provision.
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In this study, we collect evidence from a lab experiment which, to our knowledge,
is the first attempt to unearth whether and how employers can make use of workers’
pro-sociality. We consider a framework where an employer can observe a worker’s pro-
sociality before offering a compensation scheme to that worker whose effort determines
the quantity of output. The set of compensation schemes contains a piece-rate pay
scheme and a pro-social scheme (i.e., agents are paid a flat wage but a charity of agents’
choice will receive a donation which increases in agents’ effort). Screening is a thrust
of the setting: pro-social scheme may be a win for employers, but also may cause losses
to them if this compensation scheme is offered to workers who are unmotivated or
selfish. In other words, the incentive scheme should be tailored with the worker’s social
preferences. We depart from previous studies in studying two different dimensions of
workers’ pro-sociality: towards another person and towards a charity.
Using the set up described above, we ask three questions with respect to pro-sociality,
effort provision and contract choice. First, does the pro-social compensation scheme actu-
ally encourages pro-social workers in a productive way and between the two dimensions
of workers’ pro-sociality, which is the stronger driver of effort provision? Second, does
employers’ contract choice aligns with workers’ pro-sociality? If so, there should be a
difference in the average workers’ pro-social motivation between contracts offered by
employers who are exogenously given the information about their workers’ pro-social
motivation. The third question is whether the information about workers’ pro-sociality is
profitable in such a way that employers with information about workers’ pro-sociality
earn more than their counterparts without that information.
Our main results are the following. Under the pro-social compensation scheme, pro-
social workers provide higher effort compared to selfish ones. Between two pro-sociality
dimensions: towards another person or towards a charity, the former one is the stronger
driver of effort provision. Both employers’ and workers’ pro-sociality have an impact on
employers’ contract decision: the more pro-social employers or workers are, the more
likely employers are to choose the pro-social scheme. Without the information about
workers’ pro-social motivation, the piece-rate pay contract always outperforms the pro-
social one. In contrast, with that information, employers who offer the pro-social scheme
earn no less than those who offer the piece-rate pay scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section reviews the relevant
literature followed by the theoretical framework. Section 4 describes the experimental
design. The experimental results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 offers some
concluding remarks.
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3.2 Literature Review
There is a well-established literature on the interplay between pro-social motivation
and effort. Particularly, research in public economics has studied a common approach of
pro-social motivation namely public service motivation which is developed from the idea
of mission motivation in public bureaucracies (e.g., Wilson, 1989). Perry & Wise (1990)
offered three propositions: (1) the greater an individual’s public service motivation, the
more likely the individual will choose to work in public sector; (2) in public organizations,
public service motivation is positively related to performance; (3) the monetary incentive
is less pronounced in public organizations with highly pro-socially motivated workers.
According to Lerry, Hondeghem & Wise (2010), despite the variety of measures and
constructs, research in public service motivation lead to similar inferences as the above
three propositions.
Experimentalists have found evidences in line with the above propositions1. Tonin
& Vlassopoulos (2010) disentangle the two sources of workers’ pro-social motivation,
namely pure and warm-glow altruism and found that warm-glow altruism accounts for
an increase in effort provision. In the same line, Imas (2014) demonstrates that the
striking findings on warm-glow altruistic motivation which might benefit firms are: (1)
workers perform better when their effort is tied directly to charitable contribution than
when they have only standard incentive scheme; (2) an increase in charity piece rate
does not lead to an increase in their effort.
Banuri & Keefer (2016) experimentally studies the interaction between pro-social
motivation and wages by comparing two pay schemes in public and private sectors.
Specifically, subjects’ pro-social motivation are measured by a modified DG in which
the recipient is the Indonesian Red Cross and then, subjects’ efforts are measured by a
real-effort task in different compensation schemes including pro-social and piece-rate
pay: Effort for Charity (i.e., subjects’ effort will only benefit the charity); Pay-for-Effort
(i.e., piece rate pay scheme); Pro-social task (i.e., subjects are paid a flat salary and their
effort will also benefit the charity). They conducted both lab experiment on university
students in Indonesia and field experiment on workers in the Indonesian Ministry of
Finance. Their main findings are: (1) pro-socially motivated workers exert more effort
in pro-socially motivated task; (2) higher wage increases the likelihood of recruiting
non-pro-social workers in public sector.
There are a number of studies which offer different evidences on when and how
1See Francois & Vlassopoulos (2008) for a review
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workers’ pro-sociality works. Koppel & Regner (2015) disentangle the two possible
explanation for the increase of effort in workers’ pro-social motivation: (1) workers care
about the mission of the job; (2) workers care about whether employers have the same
mission preference like them. They set up a principal-agent lab experiment in which the
charity donation is conditional on workers’ performance and either employers or workers
choose the charity to which they send donation, depending on the treatment. Their lab
experimental results show that the two play an equal role in workers’ effort exertion.
In the same line, Cassar & Meier (2018) study how the perceived objective of employ-
ers can be a core factor on workers’ performance by comparing workers’ effort when the
charity donation is conditional and unconditional to the effort level. By running an online
experiment on MTurk, they provide striking findings on how pro-social motivation of
workers can backfire: when the charity donation is tied directly to workers’ performance,
workers exert less effort compared to both cases when the donation is independent of the
effort level and when there is no incentive at all. This is because the employers’ intention
for the offered compensation scheme can be interpreted as strategic or “unkind". The
reduction of effort is even more severe if the charitable incentive is offered to workers
who do not care about the charity. The authors then call for caution on using pro-social
incentives at workplace.
Most recently, Jones, Tonin &Vlassopoulos (2018) explore the interaction between
monetary incentives, pro-social motivation and performance in an environment with
multi-tasking. The novelty of this paper is the inclusion of two performance dimensions:
quantity and quality. Running a real-effort lab experiment, they compare the quantity
and quality of workers’ effort with a flat and a piece-rate pay as well as with or without
the presence of a mission. They found that without a mission, the piece-rate pay scheme
outperforms the flat one in the quantity causes a reduction in terms of quality whereas
with the presence of a mission, the piece-rate pay scheme’s impact on the quality and
quantity of effect is lessen.
Prior studies have shown how other-regarding preferences affect employers’ contract
decision. Fehr, Klein & Schmidt (2007) report the results of a lab experiment that
examines whether fairness can work as an enforcement device. Among a fixed menu
of contracts including an incentive, a trust and a bonus contract, principals choose a
contract to offer and agents choose an effort level with a given effort cost function. They
found that bonus contract is more efficient than incentive contract if there are some fair-
minded workers while trust contract is not. Principals anticipate that fairness concern
matters to agents’ decision and thus, predominantly offer bonus contract to agents.
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Cabrales, Miniaci, Piovesan & Ponti (2010) explicitly investigate if social preference
acts as a determinant in contract choice. In their settings, subjects’ distributional and
reciprocal preferences are measured with DG and Effort Game and then, they played a
Market Game in which within each matching group, four subjects are randomly assigned
as Principals and select one contract offered to the four teams of agents. Those who are
assigned as Agents then choose their preferred contract within the set of offered contracts.
Experimental results have shown that subjects’ social preferences play an underlying role
in their effort decisions. Interestingly, while principals usually offer contracts aligned
with their estimated distributional preferences, the agent is more likely to choose a
contract which minimizes the distance between her estimated preferences and the one of
the principal.
In a more general setting, Kupper & Sandner (2018) takes into account the het-
erogeneity of social preferences including rivalry, pure self-interest and altruism on
profitability of firms. They showed that a firm can increase its profit by adjusting com-
pensation in such as way that competitive agents are privileged over altruistic ones. A
firm does not pay all altruistic agents equally to motivate them but incentives would
motivate selfish and competitive agents to exert higher efforts. Hence, firms can make
use of the variety of social preferences in a team and optimize the wage compensation
system.
In terms of research question, the most closely related study to ours is Gerhards
(2013) which examines whether principals take advantage of workers in saving monetary
incentives. In a principal-agent setting, agents are offered a piece-rate pay to exert effort
which benefits not only principals but also a third party which can be either a charity or
a project. Agents are either real full-time workers in non-profit organizations or students
while principals are always students. Principals are provided information about the
non-profit organization the agents are working for or about agents’ preferred charity
organization before choosing a piece-rate pay from the set of three possible piece rates.
Due to the setup of the experiment, agents made decision using strategy method to
state their effort level and principals chose the piece rate level knowing that agents
already selected their effort level. They found that principals failed to make use of the
information about agents’ mission choice, choosing rather high piece-rate level. One of
the possible explanations for this finding is that the charity donation is not subtracted
from principals’ profit, which is usually the case in reality.
Whereas there has been a great deal of experimental evidences on the link between
pro-social motivation and effort or how other-regarding preferences shape workers’
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behavior, previous research barely test experimentally whether and how principals deal
with agents’ pro-social motivation. Our study would be the first laboratory experiment
which explicitly examines how principals exploit information on the agents’ pro-social
motivation, regardless of the working sector. Our design more closely resembles the real
world: principals can always observe workers’ pro-sociality before offering a contract
and hiring workers while workers know about the observability of their pro-sociality in
advance.
3.3 Experimental Design
Our experiment consists of three stages as follows.
• Stage 1: Pay-for-effort Slider Task
Subjects are asked to complete the slider task introduced by Gill & Prowse (2019)
under a piece-rate pay scheme. Their task is to use the mouse and adjust the
cursor to the desired position in a slider. They are given 150 seconds to complete as
many sliders as they can. They earn 5 tokens for every correctly positioned slider.
This stage provides a control for ability and motivation to work under a piece-rate
compensation of subjects. Besides, this stage also works as practice so that all
subjects are fully aware of what a person has to do and how hard the task is.
• Stage 2: Dictator Games
Subjects play two Dictator Games (DG) with two different Recipients who are
respectively another participant (PDG) and a charity (CDG). All subjects make
choices in the role of Dictators and decide how much to keep for themselves and
how much to give to the Recipient given an endowment of 100 tokens. In the CDG,
subjects are provided a list of six charity organizations and some information
about these organizations2. They will choose their preferred charity before making
decision on their donation. At the end of the experiment, one of the two Dictator
Games will be randomly selected for payment: if the PDG is chosen, subjects will
be randomly assigned as Dictators or Recipients and decisions of those who are
assigned as Dictators will be taken for payment; if the CDG is chosen, subjects will
2The six organizations include Save the Children, Red Cross, EMERGENCY, Telefono Azzuro (an
association protecting children’s rights and preventing any kind of child abuse), Fondo Ambiente Italiano
(a non-profit organization protecting and conserving the Italian historical, artistic and landscape heritage)
and Fondazione ANT Italia (a non-profit organization providing home-based care for cancer patients and
free prevention).
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earn the amount of tokens they keep for themselves while their donation will be
sent to a charity of their choice. We use subjects’ decisions in these two DGs as
proxies for their pro-social motivation.
• Stage 3: Contracted Slider Task
At the beginning of this stage, subjects are randomly matched with another partici-
pant who is definitely different from the one with whom they may be matched in
the PDG. In each pair, subjects are randomly assigned as a worker or an employers.
Those who are assigned as workers receive a pay scheme offer from employers to
do the slider task which is similar to the one in Stage 1. There are two possible pay
schemes called Contract A and Contract B: Contract A offers agents a flat pay of 60
tokens regardless of how many sliders they completed but for each slider completed,
they will give 2 tokens to the charity; Contract B offers workers a piece-rate pay of
5 tokens for each slider completed. Those who are assigned as employers choose
which pay scheme to offer to their matched workers. In both options, for every
slider the agents completed, the employer’s revenue is 10 tokens. His earnings
(profit) are given by his revenues net of the wage payment to his/her worker and
the charity donation (if any).
To avoid deceiving subjects, we delivered instructions for Stage 2 and Stage 3 at
the same time and told subjects in advance (before they make decision in DGs) that
there are two possibilities of how the pay offer is made: (1) With a probability of 1/2, the
employer cannot observe their decisions in the two DGs before choosing the pay scheme;
(2) With a probability of 1/2, the employer can observe the agent’s decision in the two
DGs before choosing the pay scheme offered to the agent. The worker will not know
whether their matched employers can observe their decision in the second stage. In any
case, the agents’ performance in Stage 1 will never be revealed and they cannot reject
the pay offer.
For convenience, we assume that employers who observe the information about their
matched worker’s pro-sociality are in the With Information treatment and those who do
not receive any information are in the No Information treatment. In the With Information
treatment, employers will have the access to the information about their workers by
clicking on the screen and they can only observe workers’ decision in the PDG and CDG
one at a time so that we can control whether and for how long they really read that
information.
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In Stage 3, the slider task will be repeated for three times which gives the employers
a chance to see how their workers respond to the contract parameters, and to adapt their
contract offers accordingly. After each period, both employers and workers will receive
feedback about the number of completed sliders and their earnings in that period. One of
three periods will be randomly selected for payment. The role and how employers choose
the pay scheme, whether he/she can observe the worker’s pro-sociality would be kept
constant across three periods. However, the matched partners of a subject across three
periods will be definitely different.
Subjects’ final earnings will equal to the sum of their earnings in each stage. They
will only receive feedback about their final payment at the end of the session.
3.4 Theoretical framework
Consider the following model which is based on the benchmark model of Besley & Ghatak
(2017): a single agent is matched with a principal who offers a compensation scheme
under which the agent exerts his effort. There are two options: Contract A offers workers
a fixed pay F (tokens), independent of his effort and additionally, a charity will be sent k
(tokens) for every unit of output; Contract B offers workers a piece-rate pay of w (tokens)
for every unit of output (w> k). In both options, the principal would get a revenue of p
(tokens) for every unit of output, where p>w> k.
If agents are selfish profit maximizers, then they will not exert any effort under
contract A, hence a rational principal should always offer contract B.
3.4.1 Agents
Assume that some agents are pro-socially motivated, apart from the direct utility from
their wage, there is also an outcome-contingent component of motivation. The agent i’s
utility depends on his wage, his cost of effort and the generated output which goes to the
principal and a charity (if Contract A is offered).
U(W , e i)=W −C(e i)+G(e i,θci ,θ
p
i ),
where W is the agent’s material payoff. The agent’s disutility of effort C(e i) increases
in effort. The non-pecuniary payoffs including the charity giving and the earnings of
the principal is denoted as G(.) which depends on the pro-social motivation of the agent
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towards a charity and towards another person respectively measured by θci and θ
p
i , θ
c
i ≥ 0,
θ
p
i ≥ 0.
Assume the cost of effort is given by C(e)= 12 e2i and the agent cares only about his/her
actual contribution to the charity of his/her choice and the principal. The agent i’s utility
in Contract A and Contract B respectively are
UA = F− 12 e2i +θci .k.e i + θ
p
i .(p.e i−F−k.e i)
UB =w.e i− 12 e2i + θ
p
i .(p.e i−w.e i),
The agent will then choose effort to maximize his/her utility. Given θci and θ
p
i , the
agent’s optimal efforts across contracts are
eA =argmax
e
(UA)= θci .k+θ
p
i .(p−k) (1)
eB =argmax
e
(UB)=w+θpi .(p−w) (2)
3.4.2 Principals
Consider the case where the information about agents’ pro-sociality is exogenously given.
Under the assumption the principals are not pro-socially motivated, Principal j’s objective
function is
p.e i−P(e i),
where P(e i) is the financial cost of provision. In our setting, P(e i) includes the cost of
wage payments and charity donation.
Given the agent’s optimal response to an offered compensation scheme, the principal’s
utility across contracts are as follows:
piA = (p−k)[θci .k+θ
p
i .(p−k)]−F
piB = (p−w)[w+θpi .(p−w)]
Since in our set-up, parameters F, k and w are exogenously given, this model predicts
that the Principal should offer Contract A iff piA >piB, that is, if
(p−k)[θci .k+θ
p
i .(p−k)]−F ≥ (p−w)[w+θ
p
i .(p−w)]
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Equivalently, θci .k.(p−k)+θ
p
i .[(p−k)2− (p−w)2]≥ F+w.(p−w) (3)
On the one hand, if the principal does not know θci , θ
p
i , he/she has to form a belief
θ̂ci and θ̂
p
i . In a one shot interaction, since the principal cannot update her belief by
observing behavior in previous periods, assume that her/his belief is given by the mean
of the prior distribution of θci , θ
p
i which are respectively E(θ
c
i ) and E(θ
p
i ). On the other
hand, if the principal can observe the extent of the agent’s pro-social motivation, he will
choose Contract A if the agent’s θc and θp fulfill (3) and the agent’s optimal effort choice
is then given by (1). Otherwise, he will choose Contract B and the agent’s optimal effort
choice is then given by (2).
There are two implications which are worth drawing from the above framework. First,
in the pro-social scheme, motivated agents may receive lower payment than if they get
piece-rate pay and yet may exert as high effort level depending on their pro-sociality. It
means that hiring a motivated agent can be profitable for principals since effort can be
incentivized at lower cost. Hence, the extent of agents’ pro-sociality measured by θc and
θp is a crucial determinant in principals’ contract offers for two reasons: (1) to minimize
the wage payment to motivated agents; (2) to avoid erroneously offer a charitable scheme
to unmotivated agents because for these agents, fixed wage means no effort.
Second, observing an agent’s pro-social motivation, the principal chooses Contract A
when the agent is highly pro-social towards either a charity (i.e., θc is large enough) or
another participant (i.e., θp is large enough) or both.
We have the following hypotheses:
• Hypothesis 1: For agents who are offered Contract A, their effort is positively
correlated to both their charity donation in the CDG and their offer to another
participant in the PDG.
Offered Contract A, agents are not monetarily incentivized. Only pro-social agents
would put effort to do the slider task because they care about the beneficiary, in the
case, a charity of their choice, and their matched principals. Hence, we hypothesize
that the number of correctly-positioned sliders agents complete increases in agents’
charity donation and offer in the two DGs.
• Hypothesis 2: For agents who are offered Contract A, between the two dimensions
of pro-sociality, the one towards another person is the stronger driver of workers’
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effort exertion.
In our experiment, p= 10 and k= 2 which implies that p−k> k. Thus, the weight
of agents’ pro-sociality towards another person is larger than the one of agents’
pro-sociality towards a charity (p−k > k in (1)), we expect that between the two
dimensions of pro-sociality, the one towards another person is the stronger driver of
workers’ effort provision: an increase in agents’ offer in the PDG has larger positive
effect on effort exertion than the same increase in agents’ charity donation in the
CDG.
• Hypothesis 3: In the With Information treatment, the likelihood of choosing Con-
tract A is positively correlated to their matched agents’ charity donation and offer to
another person.
Given the information about agents’ pro-sociality, principals would be able to make
an optimal contract offer: the pro-social compensation scheme is only offered to
pro-social workers. We should observe this contingency of contract offer on agents’
pro-sociality only in the With Information treatment.
• Hypothesis 4: In the With Information treatment, offering Contract A, the princi-
pal earns no less than those who offer the piece-rate contract to the worker.
In the With Information treatment, if principals condition their contract choice on
the information about agents’ pro-sociality, the pro-social motivation generated
by effort-contingent charity donation and profit should compensate for the lack of
monetary incentive. As a result, principals’ profit under the pro-social compensation
scheme should be no less than the one under piece-rate pay contract.
• Hypothesis 5: On average, profit of principals in the With Information treatment
is higher than the one in the No Information treatment.
With the information about agents’ pro-sociality, principals can avoid offering pro-
social compensation scheme to unmotivated agents, making use of the contingency
of effort exertion on pro-social motivation and saving monetary incentive by offering
the fixed pay contract to pro-social ones. Hence, the profit of these principals should
be higher than those who have no information about their agents’ pro-sociality.
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3.5 Experimental results
We ran 8 experimental sessions between May 2018 and March 2019 at the Cognitive
and Experimental Economics Lab (CEEL) at the University of Trento using z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). The experiment involved 160 subjects who are students of the
University of Trento recruited through an online recruitment software. Among 160
subjects, 75 subjects are male and 85 subjects are female.
A session lasted, on average, 1 hour 30 minutes. All values were expressed in tokens
and were converted at the end of the experiment at the rate of 1 Euro for 25 tokens.
Subjects knew the conversion rate in advance and were paid privately their earnings.
Subjects earned, on average, 10.8 euros which excludes a show-up fee of 3 euros and the
charity donation they made (if any).
We first summarize the results of the first two stages and then focus on the three main
research issues in our study which are the contingency of effort and compensation scheme
on pro-sociality and how information about workers’ pro-sociality can be profitable for
employers.
In the Slider Task, on average subjects complete 19 sliders, the minimum and maxi-
mum number of correct sliders are 9 and 28 respectively. The distribution of subjects’
effort in the first stage is presented in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: The distribution of effort in the Slider Task
In the two dictator games, on average, subjects give 32.3 and 29.7 tokens to a charity
of their choice and to another participant respectively. Figure 3.2 illustrates the frequency
distribution of subjects’ decision in the two dictator games, which is similar to the findings
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of Eckel & Grossman (1996): there are fewer subjects keeping all for themselves and
more subjects giving everything in the CDG than the PDG3.
Figure 3.2: The distribution of donation and offer in the DGs
3.5.1 Pro-sociality and effort
Since workers do not know whether employers observed the information about their
decision in the two DGs before making contract choice, for workers, there is no difference
in experimental setting across two treatments. Thus, we pool the data of workers’ effort
in both treatments.
In Figure 3.3, we present the distribution of ability-adjusted effort of workers across
contracts in the last period and over all periods. The ability-adjusted effort is defined
as the ratio of the number of correctly-positioned sliders in Stage 3 to the number of
correctly-positioned sliders in Stage 1. We use the ability-adjusted effort because subjects
are likely to differ in their ability to do the slider task.
3Since the charity donation in the CDG and the giving to another person in the PDG are not perfectly
correlated (r=0.28, p < 0.01), we include both of them in the same regression.
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Figure 3.3: Ability-adjusted effort across contracts in the last period and over all periods
Workers who are offered Contract A significantly deviate from the optimal level of
pure-selfish workers in the last period and over all periods (p-value < 0.01, t-tests). On
average, workers exert higher effort under Contract B than under Contract A (p-value <
0.01, t-tests).
Our first result concerns the contingency between workers’ pro-sociality and their
effort exertion.
RESULT 1: Offered the pro-social compensation scheme, workers with higher pro-
sociality exert more effort.
Support for Result 1 can be derived from Table 3.1 which reports Tobit regressions of
ability-adjusted effort on contract choice and pro-sociality of workers with the data from
the last period and over all three periods. The pro-sociality measures include workers’
charity donation in the CDG denoted as CDG and workers’ giving to another participant
in the PDG denoted as PDG. These variables are divided by 100 for presentational
convenience. The individual characteristics include gender, age and field of study.
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Dependent variable: M1 M2
ability-adjusted effort Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Contract A -0.61*** 0.17 -0.68*** 0.17
PDG -0.26** 0.12 -0.31 0.26
CDG -0.09 0.11 -0.10 0.21
Contract A x PDG 0.66** 0.29 0.72* 0.43
Contract A x CDG 0.35 0.32 0.84** 0.34
Individual characteristics Yes Yes
sigma 0.38*** 0.04 0.37*** 0.03
Constant 1.21*** 0.34 0.70 0.50
Observations 240 80
Note: ∗∗∗p< 0.01,∗∗p< 0.05,∗p< 0.1. Standard errors are clustered at individual level. Contract A is a dummy for
Contract A. PDG and CDG are workers’ decisions in the PDG and CDG respectively. Contract A x PDG and Contract
A x CDG are the interaction between Contract A and pro-sociality measures. M1 is estimated with the data from all
three periods, M2 is estimated with the data from only the last period.
Table 3.1: Tobit regression of the ability-adjusted effort on workers’ pro-sociality
The negative coefficient of Contract A confirms the outperformance of the piece-rate
pay contract in incentivizing workers compared to the fixed payment. However, as we
predict, there is a positive relationship between workers’ pro-sociality and their effort
exertion when Contract A is offered. Especially in the last period, both dimensions of
workers with pro-sociality are positively correlated with their ability-adjusted effort.
Over all three periods, offered Contract A, workers with higher pro-sociality towards
another participant exert higher effort while that dimension of pro-sociality negatively
affects workers’ effort if they are offered Contract B.
Our second result establishes that the two dimension of workers’ pro-sociality posi-
tively relate to their effort provision although each to different extent. This is one of the
key contributions of our paper.
RESULT 2: Workers’ pro-sociality towards another person is the stronger driver of
their effort exertion than the one towards a charity.
Evidence for the above result is that over all periods, only the coefficient for the
interaction between Contract A and workers’ pro-sociality in Model M1 (Table 3.1) is
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significantly different from 0 (p-value < 0.05, F-test).
The above findings suggest that pro-social motivation can substitute the monetary
incentive as workers’ effort is positively correlated with their pro-sociality. Offering the
right contract to the right worker is highly important in optimizing a compensation
scheme: piece-rate pay contract is undoubtedly powerful, generally outperforming the
pro-social contract but offering it to highly pro-social workers is not optimal.
3.5.2 Pro-sociality and contract choice
Next, we examine whether there exists a contingency of pro-sociality on contract choice
when employers are given any information about workers’ pro-social motivation. Among
40 subjects assigned as employers in the With Information treatment, there is one subject
who did not open the information box in all three periods. We exclude this subject in our
analysis. Employers’ contract choice across treatments over all periods is tabulated in
Table 3.2.
With Information No Information Total
Contract A 45 (37.61%) 44 (36.67%) 89 (37.55%)
Contract B 72 (61.54%) 76 (63.33%) 148 (62.45%)
Total 117 120 237
Table 3.2: Contract choice across treatments
RESULT 3: In the With Information treatment, employers condition their contract
choice on workers’ pro-sociality towards another participant.
Support for Result 3 can be seen on Table 3.3. Table 3.3 presents logit regressions of
employers’ contract choice on employers’ and workers’ pro-sociality measures and their
interaction with the data of the With Information treatment. Interestingly, not workers’
and employers’ pro-sociality towards a charity but their pro-social motivation towards
another person has significant effect on employers’ contract choice: the higher the offer
of a worker/an employer in the PDG, the more likely the employer chooses Contract A.
More importantly, the coefficient of the interaction between employers’ and workers’ offer
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is significantly negative, which implies that the effect of a worker’ pro-sociality on the
contract choice will decrease as employers are more pro-social towards another person.
Dependent variable: M3 M4 M5
Contract choice Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE
(1 = Contract A)
PDG_employer 2.63* 1.35 6.49** 2.61
CDG_employer 0.23 1.00 -0.90 1.58
PDG_worker 0.31 1.18 3.69* 2.23
CDG_worker -0.73 0.89 -1.70 1.41
PDG_employer x PDG_worker -11.88* 6.42
CDG_employer x CDG_worker 3.01 3.26
total_time 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Constant 3.40 3.67 1.75 3.93 3.57 4.15
Observations 117 117 117
Number of id 39 39 39
Note: Logit specification for panel data, standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01,∗ ∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.1.
PDG_employer and CDG_employer are respectively employers’ offer in the PDG and employers’ donation in the
CDG. PDG_worker and CDG_worker are respectively workers’ offer in the PDG and workers’ donation in the CDG.
The variable total_time measures the total number of seconds that employers spent to observe workers’ pro-sociality.
Other variables are interactions between employers’ types and workers’ decision in the PDG and CDG.
Table 3.3: Pro-sociality and contract choice
A key feature of the results bears emphasis: the effect of workers’ pro-sociality
towards another person on contract choice is larger when employers are not pro-social.
In other words, employers who are selfish are those who attempt to make use of their
workers by means of the information about workers’ pro-sociality, especially about how
workers care about other people like them.
3.5.3 Information and profit
In this section, we present two main results on how information about workers’ pro-
sociality benefits employers.
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RESULT 5: In the last period of the With Information treatment, the profit of employ-
ers who choose Contract A is as high as the one of employers who choose Contract B.
RESULT 6: In the last period, on average, employers in the With Information treat-
ment have higher profit than their counterparts in the No Information treatment.
Support for both results is provided by Table 3.4 which tabulates employers’ profit
across treatments in the last period and over all periods.
With Information No Information
N Avg SE Min Max N Avg SE Min Max
Last period
Contract A 11 137.8 6.7 100 172 17 98.1 22.4 -60 244
Contract B 28 135 3.3 105 160 23 135.9 5.7 50 175
Both contracts 39 135.8 3.0 100 160 40 119.8 10.4 -60 244
Over all periods
Contract A 45 96.1 11.4 -60 188 44 103.5 10.6 -60 244
Contract B 72 130.3 2.3 95 175 76 132.6 2.6 50 175
Both contracts 117 117.2 4.8 -60 188 120 121.9 4.2 -60 244
Table 3.4: Contract and profit across treatments
Over all periods, in both treatments, employers always earn less by offering the
pro-social contract (p-value < 0.01, t-tests) and there is no significant difference in profit
across treatments. Nevertheless, in the last period, without information about workers’
pro-sociality, employers earn significantly more when they offer the piece-rate payment
scheme to workers (p-value < 0.05, t-test) whereas in the With Information treatment,
there is no significant difference in profit between the two contracts (p-value > 0.1,
t-test). Also in the last period, thanks to the information about workers’ pro-sociality,
employers avoid having negative earnings if they choose Contract A. As a result, on
average, employers in the With Information treatment significantly have higher profit
than those in the No Information treatment (p-value < 0.1, t-test).
These outcomes of the last period support both Hypothesis 5 and 6. It means that the
information about workers’ pro-sociality would be profitable for employers when they
are allowed to learn. More specifically, given the information about workers’ pro-sociality,
employers avoid offering the pro-social contract to non pro-social workers. Employers,
thus, should not forgo the opportunity to screen on workers’ pro-sociality.
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In summary, we have found that under the pro-social compensation scheme, workers’
pro-sociality is positively correlated with their effort provision. Employers do condition
their contract choice on workers’ pro-sociality and they are able to make use of pro-social
compensation scheme by making the contract choice contingent with workers’ pro-social
motivation.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we use employers’ and workers’ decision in two DGs which differ in the
recipient of the game, a charity and another participant, as measures of their pro-sociality
and study the contingency of effort, contract choice and profit on their pro-sociality. With
regard to workers, we observe that effort provision is increasing in not only workers’
pro-sociality towards a charity but also and more importantly, their pro-sociality towards
another participant. This finding is consistent with the one of Fehrler & Kosfeld (2014)
but at odds with other previous studies (e.g., Tonin & Vlassopoulos, 2010; Tonin &
Vlassopoulos, 2013; Banuri & Keefer, 2016). The difference can be due to two factors.
First, in our settings, workers cannot choose their preferred compensation scheme but
are offered one by employers. Second, while previous studies have used only workers’
donation to a charity or an NGO as a measure of their pro-social motivation, we take
into account two dimensions of pro-sociality at the same time.
Our study is the first one which pins down how employers handle workers’ pro-
sociality: they condition their contract decision on workers’ pro-sociality to avoid erro-
neously offering the pro-social contract to unmotivated workers. It should be kept in
mind that the piece-rate pay contract may work poorly in some situations when the
measurement of workers’ performance is difficult or when the monetary incentive crowds
out. Our findings are thus promising as both for-profit and non-profit organizations can
replace the piece-rate pay contract by the pro-social one when offering a contract to
pro-socially motivated workers. Further studies with field experiments with different
target populations would be interesting to test the external validity of our results.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Experiment instructions (translated from Italian)
Welcome! This is a study of economic decision making. The study includes three tasks
and a questionnaire. After completing a task, you will participate the next task and
earn more money. All tasks will be computerized. We will now provide you with the
instructions for Task 1. At the end of Task 1, you will receive instructions for Task 2 and
Task 3. In each task, all participants will receive the same instruction. In all instructions,
we will always provide you true information that never deceives you in any way.
The choices made by each participant will be confidential unless explicitly specified.
Anonymity will be maintained both during and after the study: your identity will not be
made known to any participant at any time.
You will have the opportunity to earn tokens in each of the three tasks. The tokens
you earn in each task cumulate and will be converted into Euro at the end, at the rate of
1 Euro every 25 tokens. You will also receive 3 euros for showing up in this study. The
money you earn will be paid to you in private, and in cash, at the end of the study.
We ask you to turn off your phone now and not to communicate in any way with the
people present in the room until the end of the study. If you have any question, please
raise your hand and we will assist you in private. You are free to leave the study if you
want to, however, you will not receive any sum of money.
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1. Task 1
You will be provided a number of sliders. An example of a slider is as below:
Your task is to adjust each slider from the initial position at 0 to the desired position
by pressing the cursor with your mouse and dragging it. When you drag the cursor,
the black number (Value) will tell you the current position of the cursor whereas the
red number (Objective) will tell you the desired position of the cursor. The cursor is
positioned correctly when the “Value" equals the “Objective". In that case, the number of
“Objective" will turn green. After that, by clicking “Continue", you will see a new slider to
complete.
There will be a counter of time which would tell you how many seconds you have left
and another counter which would tell you how many sliders you have correctly positioned.
Before doing this task, you will be given an example of a slider to get familiar with the
task.
You will have 150 seconds to do Task 1. You earn 5 tokens for each slider that is
correctly positioned. You will know the result of the task as soon as the task finishes.
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2. Task 2
There are two parts in this task: Part 1 and Part 2. At the end of the study, one of these
subtasks will be randomly selected for the final payment.
Part 1
In this task, you will be randomly matched with another participant who is definitely
different from those who you may be matched in later tasks. You and your matched
participant will be randomly assigned as Subject A and Subject B. Subject A will be given
100 tokens . Subject B will not be given any token.
Subject A will decide how many tokens from 0 to 100 to transfer to Subject B.
You and other participants will now make decision as if you are Subject A.
At the end of the study, if Part 1 is selected for payment and you are randomly
assigned as Subject A, the transfer you make in this task will become effective and
determine your payoff and the payoff of your matched Subject B.
Part 2
In this task, you are given 100 tokens. You can send some tokens from 0 to 100 to a
charity of your choice.
If Part 2 is selected for payment, the transfer you make in this task will become
effective and determine your payoff and the amount of money the charity will be sent.
At the end of the study, if this task is chosen for payment, we would total the transfer
of all participants in this room across charities and the university will make donation to
those charities on your behalf.
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3. Task 3
In Task 3, you will be randomly matched with another participant, who is definitely
different from those with whom you may be paired with in Task 2. In each pair in Task
3, one participant will be randomly assigned as "Worker" and the other will be randomly
assigned as "Employer".
• For those who are randomly assigned as a Worker
The Worker will receive a pay offer to complete a task similar to Task 1. There are
two pay options: Option A and Option B.
- If the Worker is offered Option A, he/she will earn 60 tokens for Task 3, indepen-
dent of how many sliders he/she can adjust. Additionally, for every slider he/she
correctly adjusts, 2 tokens will be donated to a charity chosen by him/her in Task 2.
- If the Worker is offered Option B, he/she will earn 5 tokens for every correctly
adjusted slider.
• For those who are randomly assigned as an Employer
The earnings of those who are randomly assigned as Employer will depend on the
number of sliders his/her matched Worker can complete and on the chosen pay
option.
- If Option A is chosen, the earnings of Employer is:
10 x N - 60 - 2 x N
where N is the number of sliders correctly adjusted by the Worker, 60 is the number
of tokens sent to the Worker and 2 x N is the number of tokens sent to a charity
chosen by the Worker.
- If Option B is chosen, the earnings of Employer is:
10 x N - 5 x N
where 5 xN will be paid to his/her matched Worker.
• How the pay offer is selected
The payment scheme is chosen in the following way: - With a probability of 1/2, the
Employer will see their matched Worker’s decision in Task 2 before choosing the
pay offer;
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- With a probability of 1/2, the Employer will not see their matched Worker’s
decision in Task 2 before choosing the pay offer.
The Worker will not know whether their matched Employer can observe their
decision in the Task 2.
You will do Task 3 for 3 rounds and your matched Employer/Worker will be different
each round. Your role in Task 3 and how your pay offer is chosen will be kept the
same while your pay offer may be different across 3 rounds. At the end of the study,
the result of one round among three rounds will be randomly selected for payment
and determine the Employer’s, the Worker’s payoff and the donation to a charity
organization chosen by the Worker.
Final payment
The final payment is the sum of your payoffs in Task 1, Task 2 and Task 3. As
stated before, one of the two parts in Task 2 and one of three rounds in Task 3 will
be randomly chosen for the final payment. The total of your payoffs in Task 2 and
3 will be summed with your payoff in Task 1.
Your payoffs will be concerted in euro and paid in cash at the rate of 1 euro for
every 25 tokens.
The donation for charity organizations will be made with bank transfer.
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Appendix B: Pro-sociality information screens
Figure 3.4: Information about worker’s offer to another person in the PDG
Figure 3.5: Information about worker’s donation to charity in the CDG
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The experimentally-grounded approach on studying social preferences have so
far overlooked on some important aspects which were placed within the scope
of the present doctoral dissertation. Three experimental chapters center on how
distributional preferences are identified and utilized by practitioners.
In Chapter 1, the identification methods of distributional preference types in
experimental economics are discussed. The identification method using distributive
choices can be divided into two main types: parametric and non-parametric. The
parametric approach identifies types based on the assumption of a specific utility
function while the non-parametric one uses the core features of preferences. Each
identification approach has its own merits. The identification process of the non-
parametric method is quick and simple while the parametric one offers a well-
constructed theoretical framework for experimental design.
Aiming at investigating the categorical agreement of the two methods, I conduct
an experiment in which subjects perform two allocation tasks: one designed by the
parametric approach and one designed by the non-parametric approach. Accord-
ingly, subjects’ distributional preference types are identified. The experimental
result shows that the non-parametric and parametric method categorize a subject
into the same type only about 48% of the time. This fair categorical agreement is
due to two main reasons: (1) as the order of allocation choices was randomized, the
proportion of subjects unclassified by the non-parametric approach is relatively
high; (2) the parametric approach produces much higher proportion of selfish type
than the symmetric version of the task designed within the non-parametric realm.
An all-rounded examination on all four criteria including validity, reliability, output
resolution and efficiency of all available identification methods would be also a
promising and valuable extension of this chapter.
In Chapter 2, social preferences are treated as a signaling device. The novelty of
this study is the introduction of an allocation task with four distributive choices
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indicating four common distributional preference types namely selfish, inequality
averse, efficiency seeking and competitive. In the lab, subjects are classified into
four types and then play a modified DG in which dictators might observe recip-
ients’ types before making decision on their offer. The treatments are whether
recipients can revise or send the signal about their preferences. People turn out to
strategically employ a type of social preferences: the selfish revises their preferred
allocation choice so as to signal as either inequality-averse or efficiency seeking.
The selfish and competitive are also less likely to reveal their types and hence,
the majority of signalers are inequality-averse and efficiency-seeking. However,
signal receivers only condition their decision on the signal if the signal is credible
and salient: dictators only offer more to recipients signaling as inequality-averse
but this condition vanishes if dictators know that the signal might be the revised
choice.
Chapter 3 presented an experiment designed to examine how employers handle
workers’ pro-sociality. We use two DGs as proxies of one’s pro-sociality towards
another person and towards a deserving party (charity) and study employers’ con-
tract choice in a principal-agent setting in which employers may observe workers’
pro-sociality before choosing a compensation scheme to offer workers. There are two
contract choices: a standard piece-rate pay and a pro-social contract which allows
for the substitutability of pro-sociality and the motivational power of material
incentive. The experimental evidence shows that the main driver of workers’ effort
and employers’ contract choice is the workers’ pro-sociality towards another person.
More importantly, a fixed-pay contract can be as profitable as a piece-rate pay one
if it is offered to pro-socially motivated. This study is the first to demonstrate how
not only non-profit but also for-profit organizations can rely on workers’ intrinsic
motivation and hence, has managerial implications for a better design of contracts.
Despite the abundant research on social preferences, studies conducted in this
dissertation stand out as they open the door to several unsettled questions and
methodological issues. First, the findings of our review in Chapter I offer a compre-
hensive overview of the existing instruments on identifying one’s social preference
types and more importantly, draws contrasts between the advantages and weak-
nesses of the available methods. In this way, the insights gained from the review
as well as the experimental results on the different approaches’ categorial agree-
ment could be used to direct the type identification in research and practice. This
study informs researchers about the latest developments in this research area and
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uncovers gaps for subsequent investigations and development of a better social
preference identification method.
Second, the past four decades have witnessed an overload of research related
to social preferences. Many people have raised the "so what?" question: are the
discovery of social preferences and all the associated interesting findings really
valuable in any important field such as public economics, finance and development
economics. This dissertation contributes to address this question both in a general
setting (Chapter II) and with a particular reference to labor economics (Chapter III).
Experimental results in the present dissertation have highlighted the importance of
social preferences in attempt to better understand economic behavior and optimize
economic decision. Extensions of our experiments, in other mechanisms and in the
field with real employers and workers, would be an interesting direction for future
research.
From what emerged from the present work, some considerations deserve to be
remarked.
We know surprisingly little about the observability of social preference types and
how people handle it. A plausible reason could be the difficulty in exposing subjects’
information in the lab. In fact, there is no “clean" way to disclose one’s genuine
social preferences to other people. In our setting, we had to tell subjects in advance
about the observability of their decisions or let them choose which information to
be observed by others. On the one hand, that context actually brings the lab setting
closer to the real-world situation in which people can choose and change how they
want others to believe about them. For instance, workers might engage in some
voluntary activities or work in low-paid non-profit jobs to make their CVs more
attractive to employers. On the other hand, subjects whose information is disclosed
will be driven by other factors such as strategic thinking or social image concern
when making a decision while those who receive information about others’ choices
might doubt the credibility of that information. That being said, how people make
use of their own and others’ social preferences, as studied in this dissertation, is
decisive in economic decision-making.
In particular, how social preferences may alter incentives claims further rigorous
exploration. A list of potential research questions includes: whether it is possible
to design a pro-social contract which totally outperforms the performance pay
contract; whether the pro-social contract performs the same in two scenarios:
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individual-based and group-based incentive; how pro-sociality operates if there
is some degrees of conflict of interests between employers and workers. More
experimental evidence on these dynamics would have far-reaching implications
and enhance the role of social preferences in labor economics.
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